多表示安全分析

Eunsuk Kang, Aleksandar Milicevic, D. Jackson
{"title":"多表示安全分析","authors":"Eunsuk Kang, Aleksandar Milicevic, D. Jackson","doi":"10.1145/2950290.2950356","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Security attacks often exploit flaws that are not anticipated in an abstract design, but are introduced inadvertently when high-level interactions in the design are mapped to low-level behaviors in the supporting platform. This paper proposes a multi-representational approach to security analysis, where models capturing distinct (but possibly overlapping) views of a system are automatically composed in order to enable an end-to-end analysis. This approach allows the designer to incrementally explore the impact of design decisions on security, and discover attacks that span multiple layers of the system. This paper describes Poirot, a prototype implementation of the approach, and reports on our experience on applying Poirot to detect previously unknown security flaws in publicly deployed systems.","PeriodicalId":20532,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 24th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"23","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Multi-representational security analysis\",\"authors\":\"Eunsuk Kang, Aleksandar Milicevic, D. Jackson\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2950290.2950356\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Security attacks often exploit flaws that are not anticipated in an abstract design, but are introduced inadvertently when high-level interactions in the design are mapped to low-level behaviors in the supporting platform. This paper proposes a multi-representational approach to security analysis, where models capturing distinct (but possibly overlapping) views of a system are automatically composed in order to enable an end-to-end analysis. This approach allows the designer to incrementally explore the impact of design decisions on security, and discover attacks that span multiple layers of the system. This paper describes Poirot, a prototype implementation of the approach, and reports on our experience on applying Poirot to detect previously unknown security flaws in publicly deployed systems.\",\"PeriodicalId\":20532,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2016 24th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"23\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2016 24th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2950290.2950356\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2016 24th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2950290.2950356","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23

摘要

安全攻击通常利用抽象设计中没有预料到的缺陷,但当设计中的高级交互映射到支持平台中的低级行为时,这些缺陷会被无意中引入。本文提出了一种多表示的安全分析方法,其中捕获系统的不同(但可能重叠)视图的模型被自动组合以启用端到端分析。这种方法允许设计人员逐步探索设计决策对安全性的影响,并发现跨越系统多层的攻击。本文描述了该方法的原型实现Poirot,并报告了我们应用Poirot来检测公开部署系统中先前未知的安全缺陷的经验。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Multi-representational security analysis
Security attacks often exploit flaws that are not anticipated in an abstract design, but are introduced inadvertently when high-level interactions in the design are mapped to low-level behaviors in the supporting platform. This paper proposes a multi-representational approach to security analysis, where models capturing distinct (but possibly overlapping) views of a system are automatically composed in order to enable an end-to-end analysis. This approach allows the designer to incrementally explore the impact of design decisions on security, and discover attacks that span multiple layers of the system. This paper describes Poirot, a prototype implementation of the approach, and reports on our experience on applying Poirot to detect previously unknown security flaws in publicly deployed systems.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信