了解可转换债券资助的股票回购-赛普拉斯半导体案例研究

M. Gumport
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引用次数: 0

摘要

2006-2007年,转换资金股票回购很受欢迎。为什么?以赛普拉斯半导体的复杂交易为例。2007年3月,其股价为18.89美元,赛普拉斯出售了6亿美元的转股权,签订了5.71亿美元的VWAP(成交量加权平均价格)股票回购合约,买入看涨期权并卖出认股权证。它将回购2890万股股票。好的利润!糟糕的交易吗?交易完成六个月后,赛普拉斯的股价上涨51.9%,至28.70美元,到期时将获得1.8亿美元的收益,对现有股东来说,股价将上涨1.18美元(4.3%)。尽管如此,当赛普拉斯参与交易时,它:-需要11.0%的股价涨幅才能实现盈亏平衡-从盈亏平衡中获得100%的股价损失-在盈亏平衡以上28.7%的任何股价上涨中获得100%的收益-任何进一步的股价上涨仅获得13.0%的收益更简单,更优越的结构。在0-5%的额外成本下,看涨期权价差与上行相匹配,但风险降低了83%或更多。其他结构在同等(或更好)的优势下提供更低的成本。它的交易选择(完全不利;有限的上行空间)表明,赛普拉斯在执行时确信其股票将上涨。出售股票的股东是否得到充分通知?盈余管理有吸引力吗?通过税收套利获得的真正经济优势似乎受到阻碍,但权益会计让交易损失(如果发生)和大多数费用绕过损益表。根据目前的基准结算,赛普拉斯将获得1.802亿美元的收益,其中一部分(40%)是现金收入,另一部分(60%)是股份数量减少2.4%。在报告的收入中,唯一明确的货币痕迹是在交易期间2700万美元的可抵税费用;柏树可以选择显示虚幻收入,但实际税收则削减了总实际经济效益。此外,股票回购执行价格被严重低估,但公司不应重视这一特点:复杂的银团交易本身加剧了对2010 -18年治理问题的担忧,误导性的交易确认只会使股票数量和定价的其他异常情况受到不利影响。这种分析是试探性的,因为它未能确定经济或治理优势来解释转换融资回购的流行。考虑到这笔交易的低风险/回报,盈利化妆品并不令人满意。是否存在被忽视的税收优势?这笔交易受到银团的欢迎是很容易理解的,但是,就目前而言,我们想知道,这笔交易受到公司欢迎是因为它受欢迎吗?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Understanding Convertible Debt Funded Stock Buybacks - Cypress Semiconductor Case Study
In 2006-2007, convert funded stock buybacks are popular. Why? Consider Cypress Semiconductor's complex transaction. In March 2007, its stock at $18.89, Cypress sells $600 million of converts, enters a $571 million VWAP (volume weighted average price) stock buyback contract, buys calls and sells warrants. It retires 28.9 million shares. Good profits! Bad deal? Six months post deal with its stock up 51.9% to $28.70, Cypress stands to reap a $180 million benefit at maturity, a $1.18 (4.3%) stock price boon for ongoing shareholders. Still, when it enters the deal, Cypress: - Needs 11.0% stock price appreciation to break even - Is exposed to 100% of any shortfall in its stock price from breakeven - Receives 100% of any stock price increase up to 28.7% above breakeven - Receives just 13.0% of any further stock price advance Simpler, superior structures are available. At 0-5% added cost, a call spread matches upside but cuts risk 83% or more. Other structures give lower cost with equal (or better) upside. Its deal choice (full downside; limited upside) suggests Cypress at execution is sure its stock is going up. Are selling shareholders adequately informed? Is earnings management an attraction? Real economic advantage through tax arbitrage seems blocked, but equity accounting lets deal losses (if incurred) and most fees bypass the income statement. A baseline settlement at current spot has Cypress receive a $180.2 million benefit through in part (40%) cash receipts, in part (60%) a 2.4% share count reduction. The only definite monetary trace in reported income is $27.0 million of tax deductible expense over the deal's life; Cypress can elect to show phantom income, but real tax then cuts the total real economic benefit. Also, stock buyback execution prices are seriously understated, but companies should not value this feature: The complex, syndicated deal itself exacerbates 10b-18 governance concerns, and misleading trade confirmations just put other anomalies in stock volume and pricing in a bad light. This analysis is tentative insofar as it fails to identify economic or governance advantages to explain the popularity of convert funded buybacks. Earnings cosmetics is not satisfying given the deal's poor risk/reward. Is there an overlooked tax advantage? The deal's popularity with banking syndicates is easy to understand, but, for now, we wonder, could the transaction be popular with companies because it is popular?
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