你的大脑让你这么做

IF 0.4 0 RELIGION
P. Craffert
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引用次数: 0

摘要

这篇文章包含了对Benjamin Libet神经科学研究的批判性反思,该研究声称自由意志不存在,是你的大脑而不是你做出决定。利比亚风格的自由意志研究的特点是自由意志的概念缩减,二元思维的延续和自由意志的本体论弱化作为一个机械的行动,而不是作为一个复杂的过程。利比亚研究的基本哲学和形而上学假设被批判性地分析,结论是它不是关于自由意志的,也没有以任何方式解决人类自由意志的复杂本质。从另一种神经科学对自由意志的看法来看,这些研究在结论中突出了三个惊人的特征。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Your Brain Makes You Do It
This article contains a critical reflection of the neuroscientific research of Benjamin Libet which claims that free will does not exist and that it is your brain and not you that takes decisions. The Libetian style research on free will is characterised by a conceptual reduction of free will, a perpetuation of dualistic thinking and the ontological emaciation of free will as a mechanistic action instead of as a complex process. The underlying philosophical and metaphysical assumptions of Libetian research is critically analysed with the verdict that it is not about free will and that it does not in any way addresses the complex nature of free will in humans. Viewed against an alternative neuroscientific perspective on free will, three astonishing features of these studies are highlighted in conclusion.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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