{"title":"在移民法庭与警察对峙","authors":"Mary Holper","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2485328","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Immigration judges routinely use police reports to make life-altering decisions in noncitizens’ lives. The word of the police officer prevents a detainee from being released on bond, leads to negative discretionary decisions in relief from removal, and can prove that a past crime fits within a ground of removability. Yet the police officers who write these reports rarely step foot in immigration court; immigration judges rely on the hearsay document to make such critical decisions. This practice is especially troubling when the same police reports cannot be used against the noncitizen in a criminal case without the officer testifying, due to both the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and Federal Rules of Evidence, neither of which apply in immigration court. In these days of the increasing criminalization of immigration law and prioritization of deporting so-called “criminal aliens,” the police report problem is salient, and impacts thousands of noncitizens every year. This article argues for a right to confront police officers in immigration court by examining three different ways to conceptualize removal proceedings: (1) in light of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, deportation should be considered punishment, thus guaranteeing all of the protections of a criminal trial, including the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause; (2) under the Mathews v. Eldridge case-by-case balancing test of the due process clause, courts should balance the interests at stake and adopt a right to confrontation and cross-examination of police officers in immigration court; and (3) if deportation is conceptualized as “quasi-criminal” and thus deserving of some, but not all, of the protections guaranteed at a criminal trial, one of those protections should be the right to confront one’s accuser, especially when the accuser is a police officer. The scholarship has focused on why other rights guaranteed in a criminal trial – court-appointed counsel, freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom from double jeopardy, proportionality principles, and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule – should apply to removal proceedings. An overlooked criminal protection is the right to confront one’s accuser in immigration court.","PeriodicalId":83315,"journal":{"name":"The William and Mary Bill of Rights journal : a student publication of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law","volume":"15 1","pages":"675"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Confronting Cops in Immigration Court\",\"authors\":\"Mary Holper\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2485328\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Immigration judges routinely use police reports to make life-altering decisions in noncitizens’ lives. The word of the police officer prevents a detainee from being released on bond, leads to negative discretionary decisions in relief from removal, and can prove that a past crime fits within a ground of removability. Yet the police officers who write these reports rarely step foot in immigration court; immigration judges rely on the hearsay document to make such critical decisions. This practice is especially troubling when the same police reports cannot be used against the noncitizen in a criminal case without the officer testifying, due to both the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and Federal Rules of Evidence, neither of which apply in immigration court. In these days of the increasing criminalization of immigration law and prioritization of deporting so-called “criminal aliens,” the police report problem is salient, and impacts thousands of noncitizens every year. This article argues for a right to confront police officers in immigration court by examining three different ways to conceptualize removal proceedings: (1) in light of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, deportation should be considered punishment, thus guaranteeing all of the protections of a criminal trial, including the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause; (2) under the Mathews v. Eldridge case-by-case balancing test of the due process clause, courts should balance the interests at stake and adopt a right to confrontation and cross-examination of police officers in immigration court; and (3) if deportation is conceptualized as “quasi-criminal” and thus deserving of some, but not all, of the protections guaranteed at a criminal trial, one of those protections should be the right to confront one’s accuser, especially when the accuser is a police officer. The scholarship has focused on why other rights guaranteed in a criminal trial – court-appointed counsel, freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom from double jeopardy, proportionality principles, and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule – should apply to removal proceedings. 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引用次数: 1
摘要
移民法官通常会根据警方的报告,对非公民的生活做出改变命运的决定。警官的话阻止被拘留者被保释,导致在免除驱逐方面的负面自由裁量决定,并且可以证明过去的犯罪符合可驱逐的理由。然而,撰写这些报告的警察很少涉足移民法庭;移民法官依靠传闻文件做出如此关键的决定。由于《第六修正案》(Sixth Amendment)的对抗条款和《联邦证据规则》(Federal Rules of Evidence)都不适用于移民法庭,在没有警官作证的情况下,同样的警察报告不能在刑事案件中用来指控非公民,这种做法尤其令人不安。如今,移民法的刑事化程度越来越高,驱逐所谓的“犯罪外国人”的工作也越来越重要,因此,警察报告问题十分突出,每年都影响着成千上万的非公民。本文通过考察驱逐程序的三种不同概念化方式,论证了在移民法庭上与警察对峙的权利:(1)根据最高法院2010年帕迪拉诉肯塔基案的判决,驱逐出境应被视为一种惩罚,从而保证刑事审判的所有保护,包括第六修正案的对抗条款;(2)根据Mathews v. Eldridge案对正当程序条款的逐案平衡检验,法院应平衡利害攸关的利益,并在移民法庭上采纳警察对位和质证的权利;(3)如果驱逐出境被概念化为“准罪犯”,因此在刑事审判中应该得到一些(但不是全部)保障,其中一项保护应该是与原告对质的权利,特别是当原告是一名警察时。该奖学金的重点是为什么刑事审判中保障的其他权利——法院指定律师、不受追溯法约束、不受双重危险、相称原则和第四修正案排除规则——应该适用于递解程序。一项被忽视的刑事保护是在移民法庭上与原告对质的权利。
Immigration judges routinely use police reports to make life-altering decisions in noncitizens’ lives. The word of the police officer prevents a detainee from being released on bond, leads to negative discretionary decisions in relief from removal, and can prove that a past crime fits within a ground of removability. Yet the police officers who write these reports rarely step foot in immigration court; immigration judges rely on the hearsay document to make such critical decisions. This practice is especially troubling when the same police reports cannot be used against the noncitizen in a criminal case without the officer testifying, due to both the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and Federal Rules of Evidence, neither of which apply in immigration court. In these days of the increasing criminalization of immigration law and prioritization of deporting so-called “criminal aliens,” the police report problem is salient, and impacts thousands of noncitizens every year. This article argues for a right to confront police officers in immigration court by examining three different ways to conceptualize removal proceedings: (1) in light of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, deportation should be considered punishment, thus guaranteeing all of the protections of a criminal trial, including the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause; (2) under the Mathews v. Eldridge case-by-case balancing test of the due process clause, courts should balance the interests at stake and adopt a right to confrontation and cross-examination of police officers in immigration court; and (3) if deportation is conceptualized as “quasi-criminal” and thus deserving of some, but not all, of the protections guaranteed at a criminal trial, one of those protections should be the right to confront one’s accuser, especially when the accuser is a police officer. The scholarship has focused on why other rights guaranteed in a criminal trial – court-appointed counsel, freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom from double jeopardy, proportionality principles, and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule – should apply to removal proceedings. An overlooked criminal protection is the right to confront one’s accuser in immigration court.