《镜厅:大萧条、大衰退、历史的使用与误用

{"title":"《镜厅:大萧条、大衰退、历史的使用与误用","authors":"","doi":"10.5860/choice.190016","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The two great financial crises of the past century are the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession, which began in 2008. Both occurred against the backdrop of sharp credit booms, dubious banking practices, and a fragile and unstable global financial system. When markets went into cardiac arrest in 2008, policymakers invoked the lessons of the Great Depression in attempting to avert the worst. While their response prevented a financial collapse and catastrophic depression like that of the 1930s, unemployment in the U.S. and Europe still rose to excruciating high levels. Pain and suffering were widespread. The question, given this, is why didn't policymakers do better? Hall of Mirrors, Barry Eichengreen's monumental twinned history of the two crises, provides the farthest-reaching answer to this question to date. Alternating back and forth between the two crises and between North America and Europe, Eichengreen shows how fear of another Depression following the collapse of Lehman Brothers shaped policy responses on both continents, with both positive and negative results. Since bank failures were a prominent feature of the Great Depression, policymakers moved quickly to strengthen troubled banks. But because derivatives markets were not important in the 1930s, they missed problems in the so-called shadow banking system. Having done too little to support spending in the 1930s, governments also ramped up public spending this time around. But the response was indiscriminate and quickly came back to haunt overly indebted governments, particularly in Southern Europe. Moreover, because politicians overpromised, and because their measures failed to stave off a major recession, a backlash quickly developed against activist governments and central banks. Policymakers then prematurely succumbed to the temptation to return to normal policies before normal conditions had returned. The result has been a grindingly slow recovery in the United States and endless recession in Europe. Hall of Mirrors is both a major work of economic history and an essential exploration of how we avoided making only some of the same mistakes twice. It shows not just how the \"lessons\" of Great Depression history continue to shape society's response to contemporary economic problems, but also how the experience of the Great Recession will permanently change how we think about the Great Depression.","PeriodicalId":19574,"journal":{"name":"OUP Catalogue","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"95","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses-and Misuses-of History\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.5860/choice.190016\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The two great financial crises of the past century are the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession, which began in 2008. Both occurred against the backdrop of sharp credit booms, dubious banking practices, and a fragile and unstable global financial system. When markets went into cardiac arrest in 2008, policymakers invoked the lessons of the Great Depression in attempting to avert the worst. While their response prevented a financial collapse and catastrophic depression like that of the 1930s, unemployment in the U.S. and Europe still rose to excruciating high levels. Pain and suffering were widespread. The question, given this, is why didn't policymakers do better? Hall of Mirrors, Barry Eichengreen's monumental twinned history of the two crises, provides the farthest-reaching answer to this question to date. Alternating back and forth between the two crises and between North America and Europe, Eichengreen shows how fear of another Depression following the collapse of Lehman Brothers shaped policy responses on both continents, with both positive and negative results. Since bank failures were a prominent feature of the Great Depression, policymakers moved quickly to strengthen troubled banks. But because derivatives markets were not important in the 1930s, they missed problems in the so-called shadow banking system. Having done too little to support spending in the 1930s, governments also ramped up public spending this time around. But the response was indiscriminate and quickly came back to haunt overly indebted governments, particularly in Southern Europe. Moreover, because politicians overpromised, and because their measures failed to stave off a major recession, a backlash quickly developed against activist governments and central banks. Policymakers then prematurely succumbed to the temptation to return to normal policies before normal conditions had returned. The result has been a grindingly slow recovery in the United States and endless recession in Europe. Hall of Mirrors is both a major work of economic history and an essential exploration of how we avoided making only some of the same mistakes twice. It shows not just how the \\\"lessons\\\" of Great Depression history continue to shape society's response to contemporary economic problems, but also how the experience of the Great Recession will permanently change how we think about the Great Depression.\",\"PeriodicalId\":19574,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"OUP Catalogue\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"95\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"OUP Catalogue\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.190016\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"OUP Catalogue","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.190016","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 95

摘要

上个世纪的两次重大金融危机是上世纪30年代的大萧条和始于2008年的大衰退。这两次危机都发生在信贷急剧膨胀、可疑的银行业务以及脆弱而不稳定的全球金融体系的背景下。2008年,当市场陷入“心脏骤停”时,政策制定者援引大萧条(Great Depression)的教训,试图避免最坏的情况发生。尽管他们的应对措施阻止了像20世纪30年代那样的金融崩溃和灾难性的萧条,但美国和欧洲的失业率仍然上升到了令人痛苦的高水平。痛苦和折磨无处不在。鉴于此,问题是,为什么政策制定者没有做得更好?巴里·艾肯格林(Barry Eichengreen)的不朽著作《镜厅》(Hall of Mirrors)讲述了两次危机的历史,为这个问题提供了迄今为止最深远的答案。艾肯格林在两场危机之间、在北美和欧洲之间来回穿梭,展示了雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)倒闭后,对另一场大萧条的恐惧如何影响了两大洲的政策反应,其结果既有积极的,也有消极的。由于银行倒闭是大萧条的一个显著特征,政策制定者迅速采取行动,强化陷入困境的银行。但由于衍生品市场在上世纪30年代并不重要,他们忽视了所谓影子银行体系中的问题。上世纪30年代,政府在支持支出方面做得太少,这次也加大了公共支出。但这种反应是不分青红皂白的,并很快困扰着负债累累的政府,尤其是南欧国家。此外,由于政治家们过度承诺,而且他们的措施未能避免严重衰退,对激进政府和央行的强烈反对很快就出现了。于是,政策制定者们过早地屈服于诱惑,在形势恢复正常之前就回归正常政策。其结果是美国缓慢的复苏和欧洲无休止的衰退。《镜厅》既是一部重要的经济史著作,也是对我们如何避免重蹈覆辙的重要探索。它不仅展示了大萧条历史的“教训”如何继续塑造社会对当代经济问题的反应,还展示了大衰退的经历将如何永久地改变我们对大萧条的看法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses-and Misuses-of History
The two great financial crises of the past century are the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession, which began in 2008. Both occurred against the backdrop of sharp credit booms, dubious banking practices, and a fragile and unstable global financial system. When markets went into cardiac arrest in 2008, policymakers invoked the lessons of the Great Depression in attempting to avert the worst. While their response prevented a financial collapse and catastrophic depression like that of the 1930s, unemployment in the U.S. and Europe still rose to excruciating high levels. Pain and suffering were widespread. The question, given this, is why didn't policymakers do better? Hall of Mirrors, Barry Eichengreen's monumental twinned history of the two crises, provides the farthest-reaching answer to this question to date. Alternating back and forth between the two crises and between North America and Europe, Eichengreen shows how fear of another Depression following the collapse of Lehman Brothers shaped policy responses on both continents, with both positive and negative results. Since bank failures were a prominent feature of the Great Depression, policymakers moved quickly to strengthen troubled banks. But because derivatives markets were not important in the 1930s, they missed problems in the so-called shadow banking system. Having done too little to support spending in the 1930s, governments also ramped up public spending this time around. But the response was indiscriminate and quickly came back to haunt overly indebted governments, particularly in Southern Europe. Moreover, because politicians overpromised, and because their measures failed to stave off a major recession, a backlash quickly developed against activist governments and central banks. Policymakers then prematurely succumbed to the temptation to return to normal policies before normal conditions had returned. The result has been a grindingly slow recovery in the United States and endless recession in Europe. Hall of Mirrors is both a major work of economic history and an essential exploration of how we avoided making only some of the same mistakes twice. It shows not just how the "lessons" of Great Depression history continue to shape society's response to contemporary economic problems, but also how the experience of the Great Recession will permanently change how we think about the Great Depression.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信