专门的董事会委员会会影响公司政治信息披露的透明度吗?来自标准普尔500指数成份股公司的证据

D.G. DeBoskey, Yan Luo, Jeff J. Wang
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引用次数: 18

摘要

本研究考察了一种自愿性公司治理机制——专门政治献金委员会的特定属性如何提高公司政治披露的透明度。结果表明,建立和审查关键政治活动和披露政策的委员会,特别是完全由外部董事组成的委员会,显著提高了企业政治披露的透明度,并揭示了一个尚未得到充分研究的董事会委员会,政治献金委员会,有效提高了CPD的透明度。结果与代理理论一致,并进一步支持更普遍的观点,即专门的治理机制(例如,政治捐款委员会)和完全独立的委员会导致更透明的披露。最后,结果表明,政治献金委员会的存在和委员会的独立性是提高CPD透明度的渠道。寻求提高CPD透明度的公共政策制定者和监管机构可能会考虑实施法规,授权或推荐这些治理机制作为最佳实践。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do specialized board committees impact the transparency of corporate political disclosure? Evidence from S&P 500 companies

This study examines how the specific attributes of one type of voluntary corporate governance mechanism, a specialized political contribution committee, improves the transparency of corporate political disclosure (CPD). The results demonstrate that the existence of a committee that establishes and reviews key political activities and disclosure policies, particularly one composed entirely of outside directors, significantly enhances the transparency of corporate political disclosure, and reveal that an under-studied board committee, the political contribution committee, effectively improves CPD transparency. The results are consistent with agency theory and further support the more generalizable idea that specialized governance mechanisms (e.g., a political contribution committee) and fully independent committees lead to more transparent disclosure. Finally, the results suggest that the existence of a political contribution committee and committee independence are channels to improve CPD transparency. Public-policy makers and regulators seeking to enhance CPD transparency might consider implementing regulations that mandate or recommend these governance mechanisms as best practice.

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