破产案中的政府行动主义

IF 0.6 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW
Jared A. Ellias, George G. Triantis
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引用次数: 0

摘要

人们普遍认为,当受监管的企业根据破产法第11章申请破产保护时,破产法会阻碍监管执法,并给政府带来挑战。人们不太了解的是,如果政府愿意采用传统上与激进投资者相关的策略,破产法可以为政府提供推进政策目标的机会,我们称之为“政府破产行动主义”。2009年克莱斯勒和通用汽车的破产申请就是一个著名的例子:联邦政府利用破产程序帮助这两家汽车制造商解决财务困境,同时促进保护工会工人和应对气候变化的政策目标。十年后,加州政府在太平洋天然气和电力公司(Pacific Gas & Electric Company)的破产法第11章案件中运用了议价能力,以保护气候政策和野火的受害者。这些例子表明,通过利用破产制度,政府可以获得债务人根据破产法享有的特殊权力,这可以补充拨款和监管的传统工具,以促进和加速政策成果。这一策略在紧急和政策瘫痪时期尤其有用,因为政府破产行动主义可以提供一条途径,绕过政治体系中各种利益相关者和参与者的拖延和否决障碍。然而,通过破产制度制定政策也有潜在的缺点,因为它也可能使政府逃避民主问责制,并掩盖利益相关者被迫吸收的财务损失,以帮助为这些政策结果提供资金。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Government Activism in Bankruptcy
It is widely recognized that bankruptcy law can stymie regulatory enforcement and present challenges for governments when regulated businesses file for Chapter 11. It is less-widely understood that bankruptcy law can present governments with opportunities to advance policy goals if they are willing to adopt tactics traditionally associated with activist investors, a strategy we call “government bankruptcy activism.” The bankruptcy filings by Chrysler and General Motors in 2009 are a famous example: the Federal government used the bankruptcy process to help both auto manufacturers resolve their financial distress while promoting the policy objectives of protecting union workers and addressing climate change. A decade later, the government of California applied its bargaining power in the Pacific Gas & Electric Company’s Chapter 11 case to protect climate policies and the victims of wildfires. These examples illustrate that, by tapping into the bankruptcy system, governments gain access to the exceptional powers that a debtor enjoys under bankruptcy law, which can complement the traditional tools of appropriations and regulation to facilitate and accelerate policy outcomes. This strategy is especially useful in times of urgency and policy paralysis, when government bankruptcy activism can provide a pathway around the delay and veto obstacles of the various stakeholders and players in the political system. However, making policy through the bankruptcy system presents potential downsides as well, as it may also allow governments to evade democratic accountability and obscure the financial losses that stakeholders are forced to absorb to help fund those policy outcomes.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
4
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