内幕弃权

J. Fried
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引用次数: 9

摘要

根据传统观点,内部人士利用私人信息来回避交易,与内幕交易一样,也引发了政策担忧。这种被广泛接受的看法主导了很多关于内幕交易监管的学术辩论。我认为这种观点是完全错误的:只要内部人士在掌握非公开信息的情况下不能进行交易,他们利用非公开信息不进行交易的能力就不会使他们比公众股东更有优势。然后,我解释了为什么内部人弃权不会引起可能与内幕交易相关的同一类型的经济扭曲。最后,我分析了我的研究结果对内幕交易监管中一些问题的影响,包括使用与占有辩论和10b5-1规则安全港。关键词:
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Insider Abstention
According to conventional wisdom, insiders' use of private information to abstain from trading raises the same policy concerns as insider trading. This widely held perception has dominated much of the academic debate over the regulation of insider trading. I show that this view is flatly incorrect: as long as insiders cannot trade while in possession of nonpublic information, their ability to use nonpublic information to abstain from trading does not make them better off than public shareholders. I then explain why insider abstention cannot give rise to the same type of economic distortions that might be associated with insider trading. I conclude by analyzing the implications of my findings for a number of issues in insider trading regulation, including the use vs. possession debate and the Rule 10b5-1 safe harbor. Key Words:
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