对大银行的强制执行

David T. Zaring
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引用次数: 1

摘要

作为一家大银行,意味着定期向多家不同的监管机构支付巨额罚款,外加大量的道歉,并承诺下次会做得更好。本文使用手工收集的数据集来展示在多德-弗兰克华尔街改革法案通过后,这种强制执行在美国是如何运作的。美国监管机构倾向于成群结队地追捕大银行,多个监管机构因同样的不当行为对金融机构处以罚款。监管机构经常以一种“病毒式”的方式执行:一旦他们因某种不当行为制裁一家银行,他们就会因同样的不当行为制裁另一家银行的可能性增加。一些监管机构喜欢将银行各种不同的非法行为捆绑到一个全球结算中。与主要银行监管机构的执法水平相比,司法部的执法可能导致极其昂贵的和解;总体而言,美国司法部以美元计算的制裁令监管银行部分业务的所有其他机构相形见绌。尽管有相反的怀疑,但美国的执法似乎并没有保护国内银行,也没有歧视外国银行。尽管本文的主要目标是理解联邦政府的整体执法实践,但本文提出了一个建议:刑事检察官在公布对银行的起诉和和解之前,应咨询安全和稳健监管机构。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Enforcement Against the Biggest Banks
Being a big bank means the regular payment of huge fines to a number of different regulators, paired with profuse apologies, and promises to do better next time. This article makes use of a hand-collected dataset to show how this enforcement worked in the United States after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act. American regulators have tended to hunt the big banks in packs, with multiple regulators pursuing fines against financial institutions for the same misconduct. Regulators frequently enforce in a ‘viral’ manner: once they sanction one bank for a type of misconduct, the chances that they will sanction another bank for the same sort of misconduct increases. Some regulators like to bundle a variety of different unlawful actions by banks into one global settlement. Enforcement by the Department of Justice can result in spectacularly expensive settlements compared to the level of enforcement by primary banking regulatory agencies; overall, Department of Justice sanctions in dollars dwarf those of all other agencies policing part of what a bank does. American enforcement, despite suspicion to the contrary, does not appear to protect domestic banks and discriminate against foreign ones. Although this article’s primary goal is to make sense of the federal government’s overall enforcement practices, one recommendation is made: criminal prosecutors should consult with safety and soundness regulators before unveiling indictments and settlements against banks.
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