Kevin J. S. Zollman, Julian García, Toby Handfield
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Academic journals, incentives, and the quality of peer review: a model
We model the impact of different incentives on journal behavior in undertaking peer review. Under one scheme, the journal aims to publish the highest quality papers; under the second, the journal aims to maintain a high rejection rate. Under both schemes, journals prefer to set very high standards for acceptance despite allowing significant error in peer review. Under the second scheme, however, in order to encourage more submissions from mediocre papers, the journal is incentivized to make its editorial process less accurate. This leads to both worse peer review and to lower quality articles being published.
期刊介绍:
Since its inception in 1934, Philosophy of Science, along with its sponsoring society, the Philosophy of Science Association, has been dedicated to the furthering of studies and free discussion from diverse standpoints in the philosophy of science. The journal contains essays, discussion articles, and book reviews.