电子政务服务外包的BOO模型

Jing-yun LU , Wei-jun ZHONG , Shu-e MEI
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引用次数: 2

摘要

外包电子政务服务有助于政府克服缺乏熟练的IT人员和有限的财政资源等障碍。政府外包电子政务服务有几种模式。本文分析了其中一种外包模式;基于交易成本理论的建筑-拥有-经营(BOO)模型。通过对外包策略的建模,讨论了电子政务效益最大化和供应商利润最大化的问题。讨论了供应商某种程度的逃避行为对电子政务预期收益的影响,以及政府可以采取哪些激励政策来消除逃避行为对供应商的吸引力。本文中使用的方法为双方在处理外包决策问题时分析一些复杂问题提供了策略和技术。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
BOO Model for Outsourcing E-Government Services

Outsourcing E-government services helps governments to overcome barriers, such as lacking skilled IT Staff and limited financial resources. There are some models for the government to outsource its E-government services. This article analyzes one of such outsourcing model; building-owning-operation (BOO) using a transaction cost theory approach. By modeling the outsourcing strategy, the article argues about the maximum E-government benefit and the maximum profit of the vendor. It also discusses the expected E-government benefit that is affected by the vendor's some degree of shirking and the incentive policy which the government can adopt to remove the attractiveness of shirking to the vendor. The approach used in this article provides both of the contracting parties with a strategy and techniques for analyzing some complex issues when they deal with outsourcing decision-problems.

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