{"title":"普鲁萨克《奥古斯丁在《忏悔录》中关于邪恶不存在的论点分析》的回应","authors":"Jonathan Yates","doi":"10.1558/EXPO.V3I1.77","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In these comments on Bernard G. Prusak's analysis of Augustine's argument against the existence of evil, I attempt to show that neither Prusak’s analysis nor his conclusion is thorough enough to compel us to follow him in what I take to be his major assertion, viz. that Augustine’s conceptions regarding the nature of creation and the nature of evil are both something less than fully compelling.","PeriodicalId":30121,"journal":{"name":"Expositions Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities","volume":"12 1","pages":"77-93"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"B.G. Prusak’s “An Analysis of Augustine’s Argument in Confessions That Evil Does Not Exist”: A Response\",\"authors\":\"Jonathan Yates\",\"doi\":\"10.1558/EXPO.V3I1.77\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In these comments on Bernard G. Prusak's analysis of Augustine's argument against the existence of evil, I attempt to show that neither Prusak’s analysis nor his conclusion is thorough enough to compel us to follow him in what I take to be his major assertion, viz. that Augustine’s conceptions regarding the nature of creation and the nature of evil are both something less than fully compelling.\",\"PeriodicalId\":30121,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Expositions Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities\",\"volume\":\"12 1\",\"pages\":\"77-93\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Expositions Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1558/EXPO.V3I1.77\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Expositions Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1558/EXPO.V3I1.77","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
在这些关于Bernard G. Prusak对奥古斯丁反对邪恶存在的论证的分析的评论中,我试图表明,无论是普鲁士的分析还是他的结论都不够彻底,不足以迫使我们遵循他的主要主张,即奥古斯丁关于创造的本质和邪恶的本质的概念都不是完全令人信服的。
B.G. Prusak’s “An Analysis of Augustine’s Argument in Confessions That Evil Does Not Exist”: A Response
In these comments on Bernard G. Prusak's analysis of Augustine's argument against the existence of evil, I attempt to show that neither Prusak’s analysis nor his conclusion is thorough enough to compel us to follow him in what I take to be his major assertion, viz. that Augustine’s conceptions regarding the nature of creation and the nature of evil are both something less than fully compelling.