令人不安的中央银行知识:经济专业知识面临可见性困境

IF 4 2区 社会学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Jacqueline Best
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引用次数: 7

摘要

中央银行家如何在不失去权威的情况下,应对他们的专业知识存在重大限制这一令人不安的事实?借鉴史蒂夫·雷纳的“不舒服的知识”的概念,本文进行的历史考察早期的保罗•沃尔克(Paul Volcker)的角色在美国联邦储备理事会(美联储,fed)的负责人,然后痕迹的方式无知的不舒服的事实已经在随后的几年里处理:从1980年代的反射性和实验方法,通过大缓和的解雇和位移,例外论,2008后的新经验主义时代。我认为,在上述每一个时代,央行都面临着一种可见性困境:它们的专业知识必须足够显眼,以展示它们的精通程度,但又不能太显眼,以至于它们的技巧往往是临时的、不确定的,从而引发对其角色和权威的政治抵制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Uncomfortable knowledge in central banking: Economic expertise confronts the visibility dilemma
Abstract How do central bankers cope with the uncomfortable fact that there are significant limits to their expertise without losing authority? Drawing on Steve Rayner’s concept of ‘uncomfortable knowledge’, this paper undertakes a historical examination of the early years of Paul Volcker’s role at the head of the Federal Reserve, and then traces the ways in which the uncomfortable fact of ignorance has been dealt with in the years since then: from the reflexive and experimental approach of the 1980s, through the dismissal and displacement of the Great Moderation, to the exceptionalism and new experimentalism of the post-2008 era. In each of these eras, I argue that central banks face a visibility dilemma: their expertise must be visible enough to demonstrate their mastery but not so conspicuous that the often ad hoc and uncertain nature of their craft generates political push-back about their role and authority.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
5.90%
发文量
23
期刊介绍: This radical interdisciplinary journal of theory and politics continues to be one of the most exciting and influential resources for scholars in the social sciences worldwide. As one of the field"s leading scholarly refereed journals, Economy and Society plays a key role in promoting new debates and currents of social thought. For 37 years, the journal has explored the social sciences in the broadest interdisciplinary sense, in innovative articles from some of the world"s leading sociologists and anthropologists, political scientists, legal theorists, philosophers, economists and other renowned scholars.
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