小团体健康保险市场风险再分类

Sebastián Fleitas, Gautam Gowrisankaran, A. L. Lo Sasso
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引用次数: 12

摘要

我们从ACA社区评级法规出台之前的一段时间评估小团体健康保险市场的重新分类风险。使用来自一家大型保险公司的详细个人层面数据,我们发现从健康风险到保费的传递中有16%具有投保人固定效应,而70%没有固定效应。固定影响估计确定了保险人将风险变化转嫁到保费变化的程度,而没有固定影响的较高估计可能是由于新账户的风险评级更高。我们的估计控制选择进入保险承担与非参数选择模型,使用个人风险和工业部门作为排除限制。我们的结果对其他可能性也很稳健,包括风险评分的潜在测量误差和随着时间的推移缓慢传递。我们试图解释为什么我们的固定效应估计更接近社区评级,而不是完全经验评级。有限的传递可能是由于保险公司单方面定价承诺的隐性“保证可再生”合同,因为我们的结果与这些合同下可能发生的均衡传递大致一致。我们的结果不能用市场力量、搜索摩擦或缓慢的传递来解释。我们模拟了保险公司的定价政策相对于反事实定价政策所产生的价值。保险公司的政策产生60%的福利收益来自社区评级相对于充分经验评级。即使是社区评级的计划,由于高昂的自付费用,也会产生大量的重新分类风险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Reclassification Risk in the Small Group Health Insurance Market
We evaluate reclassification risk in the small group health insurance market from a period before ACA community rating regulations. Using detailed individual-level data from a large insurer, we find a pass through of 16% from health risk to premiums with enrollee fixed effects, and 70% without fixed effects. The fixed effects estimates identify the extent to which the insurer passes through changes in risk to changes in premiums while the higher estimates without fixed effects may be due to more risk rating for new accounts. Our estimates control for selection into insurance take-up with a non-parametric selection model, using individual risk and industrial sector as exclusion restrictions. Our results are also robust to other possibilities, including potential measurement error of risk scores and slow pass through over time. We seek to explain why our fixed effects estimates are much closer to community rating than full experience rating. The limited pass through may be due to implicit “guaranteed renewability” contracts with one-sided pricing commitment on the part of the insurer, as our results are broadly consistent with the equilibrium pass through that would occur under these contracts. Our results cannot be explained by market power, search frictions, or slow pass through over time. We simulate the value that is generated by the insurer’s pricing policy relative to counterfactual pricing policies. The insurer’s policy generates 60% of the welfare gain from community rating relative to full experience rating. Even community rated plans generate substantial reclassification risk due to high out-of-pocket costs.
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