卖空机制对企业现金持有量的影响——来自中国的证据

Crystal Xiaobei Chen, Q. He
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摘要

摘要:卖空机制是提高资本市场效率的一项重要决策。中国从2010年开始实施卖空政策。本文选取2007 - 2016年所有a板上市公司作为样本。通过对比未加入卖空政策的企业的现金持有量,发现参与卖空政策的企业的现金持有量明显低于未加入卖空政策的企业。研究还发现,这种效应对不同特征的企业有不同的影响。对于参与卖空机制前内部治理较差的企业,现金持有量减少的效果更为明显。其次,减少现金持有量的影响仅在融资约束较小的样本组中显著。最后,在市场水平较低的地区,卖空政策并未显著降低现金持有量,但在市场水平较高的地区,这种效果更为显著。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Effects of Short Selling Mechanism on Corporate Cash Holding – Evidence in China
Abstract: The short-selling mechanism is an important decision to improve the efficiency of the capital market. China began implementing the short-selling policy in 2010. This paper selects the sample of all A-board listed companies from 2007 to 2016. By comparing the cash holdings of the enterprises that have not joined the short selling policy, it is found that the cash holdings of the enterprises participating in the short selling policy are significantly lower than those without the short selling policy. It is also found that this effect has different effects on enterprises with different characteristics. For enterprises with worse internal governance before participating in the short selling mechanism, the effect of cash holdings reduction is more obvious. Secondly, the effect of the reduction on cash holdings is only significant in the sample group with smaller financing constraints. Finally, in areas with low market level, the short selling policy does not significantly reduce the amount of cash holdings, but in higher market areas, this effect is more significant.
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