{"title":"系统性操作风险:英国支付保护保险丑闻","authors":"P. Mcconnell, K. Blacker","doi":"10.21314/JOP.2012.104","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"May 2011 was a very bad month for UK banks. In the previous month, a long running legal case was resolved when the UK High Court ruled against the British Banking Association (BBA) which had petitioned for a judicial review of regulatory action concerning mis-selling of Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) products. Following the ruling, the four major UK banks announced provisions totaling over £6 billion to cover restitution to buyers of their PPI products. Some of the banks also decided to exit the PPI business.At first glance, PPI appears to be standard insurance product. For an up-front or monthly premium, an insurer will sell protection to a borrower against being unable to make loan repayments, as a result of, for example, illness or unemployment. Before the market collapsed, the main distributors/arrangers of PPI contracts were the largest UK banks, often using their affiliated insurance subsidiary as the insurer.The underlying problems that generated the so-called PPI Scandal should not have come as a complete surprise to the banks. For several years prior to the ruling, consumer advocacy groups had been complaining loudly about banks selling PPI products to customers who did not fully understand the policies and, in many cases, did not need the protection provided. Yet, having seemingly taken on a life of its own, the practice of selling PPI policies continued and grew rapidly in all major banks. Various official inquiries found that the 'people' involved, from front line bank staff, lending managers to insurers just did not do the full due diligence necessary to check the suitability of PPI for many customers. Prudence seems to have been diluted/abandoned in a chase for increased product volume across the whole UK retail-banking sector. This paper argues that the losses incurred as a result of the PPI scandal were, in most part, precipitated by Systemic Operational Risk, in particular, People-related Risks. Using examples from official inquiries, the paper identifies some of the People Risks that went unmanaged in this part of the UK Retail banking sector system, until the PPI market seized up in 2011. The paper then suggests proactive approaches to People Risk Management that should help detect and minimize the impact of similar scandals in future. This topic is important as the demographic shift towards longer periods of retirement and the prevalence of the 'universal banking model', means that non-traditional banking products such insurance, pensions and investments, will be increasingly sold through banks, raising the specter of further mis-selling scandals in future.","PeriodicalId":54030,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Operational Risk","volume":"38 1","pages":"79-139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2012-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"25","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Systemic Operational Risk the UK Payment Protection Insurance Scandal\",\"authors\":\"P. Mcconnell, K. Blacker\",\"doi\":\"10.21314/JOP.2012.104\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"May 2011 was a very bad month for UK banks. In the previous month, a long running legal case was resolved when the UK High Court ruled against the British Banking Association (BBA) which had petitioned for a judicial review of regulatory action concerning mis-selling of Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) products. Following the ruling, the four major UK banks announced provisions totaling over £6 billion to cover restitution to buyers of their PPI products. Some of the banks also decided to exit the PPI business.At first glance, PPI appears to be standard insurance product. For an up-front or monthly premium, an insurer will sell protection to a borrower against being unable to make loan repayments, as a result of, for example, illness or unemployment. Before the market collapsed, the main distributors/arrangers of PPI contracts were the largest UK banks, often using their affiliated insurance subsidiary as the insurer.The underlying problems that generated the so-called PPI Scandal should not have come as a complete surprise to the banks. For several years prior to the ruling, consumer advocacy groups had been complaining loudly about banks selling PPI products to customers who did not fully understand the policies and, in many cases, did not need the protection provided. Yet, having seemingly taken on a life of its own, the practice of selling PPI policies continued and grew rapidly in all major banks. Various official inquiries found that the 'people' involved, from front line bank staff, lending managers to insurers just did not do the full due diligence necessary to check the suitability of PPI for many customers. Prudence seems to have been diluted/abandoned in a chase for increased product volume across the whole UK retail-banking sector. This paper argues that the losses incurred as a result of the PPI scandal were, in most part, precipitated by Systemic Operational Risk, in particular, People-related Risks. Using examples from official inquiries, the paper identifies some of the People Risks that went unmanaged in this part of the UK Retail banking sector system, until the PPI market seized up in 2011. The paper then suggests proactive approaches to People Risk Management that should help detect and minimize the impact of similar scandals in future. This topic is important as the demographic shift towards longer periods of retirement and the prevalence of the 'universal banking model', means that non-traditional banking products such insurance, pensions and investments, will be increasingly sold through banks, raising the specter of further mis-selling scandals in future.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54030,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Operational Risk\",\"volume\":\"38 1\",\"pages\":\"79-139\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-05-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"25\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Operational Risk\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21314/JOP.2012.104\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Operational Risk","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21314/JOP.2012.104","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Systemic Operational Risk the UK Payment Protection Insurance Scandal
May 2011 was a very bad month for UK banks. In the previous month, a long running legal case was resolved when the UK High Court ruled against the British Banking Association (BBA) which had petitioned for a judicial review of regulatory action concerning mis-selling of Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) products. Following the ruling, the four major UK banks announced provisions totaling over £6 billion to cover restitution to buyers of their PPI products. Some of the banks also decided to exit the PPI business.At first glance, PPI appears to be standard insurance product. For an up-front or monthly premium, an insurer will sell protection to a borrower against being unable to make loan repayments, as a result of, for example, illness or unemployment. Before the market collapsed, the main distributors/arrangers of PPI contracts were the largest UK banks, often using their affiliated insurance subsidiary as the insurer.The underlying problems that generated the so-called PPI Scandal should not have come as a complete surprise to the banks. For several years prior to the ruling, consumer advocacy groups had been complaining loudly about banks selling PPI products to customers who did not fully understand the policies and, in many cases, did not need the protection provided. Yet, having seemingly taken on a life of its own, the practice of selling PPI policies continued and grew rapidly in all major banks. Various official inquiries found that the 'people' involved, from front line bank staff, lending managers to insurers just did not do the full due diligence necessary to check the suitability of PPI for many customers. Prudence seems to have been diluted/abandoned in a chase for increased product volume across the whole UK retail-banking sector. This paper argues that the losses incurred as a result of the PPI scandal were, in most part, precipitated by Systemic Operational Risk, in particular, People-related Risks. Using examples from official inquiries, the paper identifies some of the People Risks that went unmanaged in this part of the UK Retail banking sector system, until the PPI market seized up in 2011. The paper then suggests proactive approaches to People Risk Management that should help detect and minimize the impact of similar scandals in future. This topic is important as the demographic shift towards longer periods of retirement and the prevalence of the 'universal banking model', means that non-traditional banking products such insurance, pensions and investments, will be increasingly sold through banks, raising the specter of further mis-selling scandals in future.
期刊介绍:
In December 2017, the Basel Committee published the final version of its standardized measurement approach (SMA) methodology, which will replace the approaches set out in Basel II (ie, the simpler standardized approaches and advanced measurement approach (AMA) that allowed use of internal models) from January 1, 2022. Independently of the Basel III rules, in order to manage and mitigate risks, they still need to be measurable by anyone. The operational risk industry needs to keep that in mind. While the purpose of the now defunct AMA was to find out the level of regulatory capital to protect a firm against operational risks, we still can – and should – use models to estimate operational risk economic capital. Without these, the task of managing and mitigating capital would be incredibly difficult. These internal models are now unshackled from regulatory requirements and can be optimized for managing the daily risks to which financial institutions are exposed. In addition, operational risk models can and should be used for stress tests and Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). The Journal of Operational Risk also welcomes papers on nonfinancial risks as well as topics including, but not limited to, the following. The modeling and management of operational risk. Recent advances in techniques used to model operational risk, eg, copulas, correlation, aggregate loss distributions, Bayesian methods and extreme value theory. The pricing and hedging of operational risk and/or any risk transfer techniques. Data modeling external loss data, business control factors and scenario analysis. Models used to aggregate different types of data. Causal models that link key risk indicators and macroeconomic factors to operational losses. Regulatory issues, such as Basel II or any other local regulatory issue. Enterprise risk management. Cyber risk. Big data.