系统性操作风险:英国支付保护保险丑闻

IF 0.4 4区 经济学 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE
P. Mcconnell, K. Blacker
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引用次数: 25

摘要

2011年5月对英国银行业来说是非常糟糕的一个月。上个月,英国高等法院判决英国银行业协会(BBA)败诉,该协会曾请求对不当销售支付保护保险(PPI)产品的监管行动进行司法审查。在裁决之后,英国四大银行宣布了总计超过60亿英镑的拨备,用于向购买其个人保险产品的买家进行赔偿。一些银行还决定退出个人保险产品业务。乍一看,PPI似乎是标准的保险产品。对于预付保险费或每月保险费,保险公司将向借款人出售保险,以防止由于疾病或失业等原因而无法偿还贷款。在市场崩溃之前,个人保险合约的主要分销商/安排商是英国最大的银行,它们通常使用其附属保险子公司作为保险公司。导致所谓的“个人价格指数丑闻”(PPI Scandal)的根本问题,不应该让银行完全感到意外。在裁决之前的几年里,消费者权益组织一直在大声抱怨银行向不完全了解保单的客户销售个人保险产品,在许多情况下,这些客户并不需要提供的保护。然而,在所有主要银行中,销售PPI保单的做法仍在继续,并迅速增长,这种做法似乎已经有了自己的生命。各种官方调查发现,从一线银行员工、贷款经理到保险公司,涉及的“人”都没有进行充分的尽职调查,以检查PPI对许多客户的适用性。在整个英国零售银行业对增加产品数量的追逐中,审慎似乎已被稀释或放弃。本文认为,PPI丑闻造成的损失在很大程度上是由系统性操作风险,特别是与人有关的风险造成的。本文以官方调查中的例子为例,指出了在2011年个人个人保险(PPI)市场失灵之前,英国零售银行业体系中这部分没有得到管理的一些人风险(People Risks)。然后,论文提出了积极主动的人员风险管理方法,这些方法应该有助于发现并尽量减少未来类似丑闻的影响。随着人口结构向更长的退休期转变,以及“全能银行模式”的盛行,这意味着保险、养老金和投资等非传统银行产品将越来越多地通过银行销售,这一话题非常重要,这引发了未来进一步不当销售丑闻的担忧。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Systemic Operational Risk the UK Payment Protection Insurance Scandal
May 2011 was a very bad month for UK banks. In the previous month, a long running legal case was resolved when the UK High Court ruled against the British Banking Association (BBA) which had petitioned for a judicial review of regulatory action concerning mis-selling of Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) products. Following the ruling, the four major UK banks announced provisions totaling over £6 billion to cover restitution to buyers of their PPI products. Some of the banks also decided to exit the PPI business.At first glance, PPI appears to be standard insurance product. For an up-front or monthly premium, an insurer will sell protection to a borrower against being unable to make loan repayments, as a result of, for example, illness or unemployment. Before the market collapsed, the main distributors/arrangers of PPI contracts were the largest UK banks, often using their affiliated insurance subsidiary as the insurer.The underlying problems that generated the so-called PPI Scandal should not have come as a complete surprise to the banks. For several years prior to the ruling, consumer advocacy groups had been complaining loudly about banks selling PPI products to customers who did not fully understand the policies and, in many cases, did not need the protection provided. Yet, having seemingly taken on a life of its own, the practice of selling PPI policies continued and grew rapidly in all major banks. Various official inquiries found that the 'people' involved, from front line bank staff, lending managers to insurers just did not do the full due diligence necessary to check the suitability of PPI for many customers. Prudence seems to have been diluted/abandoned in a chase for increased product volume across the whole UK retail-banking sector. This paper argues that the losses incurred as a result of the PPI scandal were, in most part, precipitated by Systemic Operational Risk, in particular, People-related Risks. Using examples from official inquiries, the paper identifies some of the People Risks that went unmanaged in this part of the UK Retail banking sector system, until the PPI market seized up in 2011. The paper then suggests proactive approaches to People Risk Management that should help detect and minimize the impact of similar scandals in future. This topic is important as the demographic shift towards longer periods of retirement and the prevalence of the 'universal banking model', means that non-traditional banking products such insurance, pensions and investments, will be increasingly sold through banks, raising the specter of further mis-selling scandals in future.
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来源期刊
Journal of Operational Risk
Journal of Operational Risk BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
40.00%
发文量
6
期刊介绍: In December 2017, the Basel Committee published the final version of its standardized measurement approach (SMA) methodology, which will replace the approaches set out in Basel II (ie, the simpler standardized approaches and advanced measurement approach (AMA) that allowed use of internal models) from January 1, 2022. Independently of the Basel III rules, in order to manage and mitigate risks, they still need to be measurable by anyone. The operational risk industry needs to keep that in mind. While the purpose of the now defunct AMA was to find out the level of regulatory capital to protect a firm against operational risks, we still can – and should – use models to estimate operational risk economic capital. Without these, the task of managing and mitigating capital would be incredibly difficult. These internal models are now unshackled from regulatory requirements and can be optimized for managing the daily risks to which financial institutions are exposed. In addition, operational risk models can and should be used for stress tests and Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). The Journal of Operational Risk also welcomes papers on nonfinancial risks as well as topics including, but not limited to, the following. The modeling and management of operational risk. Recent advances in techniques used to model operational risk, eg, copulas, correlation, aggregate loss distributions, Bayesian methods and extreme value theory. The pricing and hedging of operational risk and/or any risk transfer techniques. Data modeling external loss data, business control factors and scenario analysis. Models used to aggregate different types of data. Causal models that link key risk indicators and macroeconomic factors to operational losses. Regulatory issues, such as Basel II or any other local regulatory issue. Enterprise risk management. Cyber risk. Big data.
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