碳预算的全球一致均衡

Humberto Llavador, J. Roemer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

碳预算是确定减缓气候变化挑战的一种有用方法,比排放分配更容易达成一致。我们建议建立一种机制,让各国就全球碳预算达成一致,而排放的决定权在国家层面上分散。这些收入由一个全球基金收集,并根据与气候变化边际成本成正比的内生定义的权重进行分配。该提案的特点是世界各国公民和全球帕累托效率的一致同意。我们本着《巴黎协定》的精神进行了模拟,2055年后实现零排放。在全球一致均衡下,许可价格为90美元/tC,每年收益1.3万亿美元。非洲、印度和亚洲欠发达国家是仅有的净接受国,而美国和中国是最大的净捐助国。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Global Unanimity Equilibrium on the Carbon Budget
Carbon budgets are a useful way to frame the climate mitigation challenge and much easier to agree upon than the allocation of emissions. We propose a mechanism with countries agreeing on the global carbon budget, while the decision to emit is decentralized at the country level. The revenue is collected in a global fund and allocated according to endogenously defined weights proportional to the marginal cost of climate change. The proposal features a unanimous agreement of the national citizenries of the world and global Pareto efficiency. We run a simulation in the spirit of the Paris Agreement, with zero emissions after 2055. At the Global Unanimity Equilibrium, permits are priced at 90$/tC, yielding 1.3 trillion dollars annually. Africa, India and the less developed countries in Asia are the only net recipients, while the US and China are the largest net contributors.
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