{"title":"作为皇家法庭的大学:一则寓言","authors":"P. Frijters","doi":"10.22459/AG.20.01.2013.05","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Productivity Commission report 'Disability Care and Support' recommends tort liability be replaced by a compulsory, government-run, no-fault scheme. But theory and evidence indicate moving to a no-fault scheme will increase the accident rate. Even a move from non-risk-rated third-party insurance to non-risk-rated first-party insurance reduces incentives for care. A no-fault scheme is not superior to current policies; genuine reform will need to be informed by law and economics literature.","PeriodicalId":41700,"journal":{"name":"Agenda-A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform","volume":"8 1","pages":"71-78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Universities as Royal Courts: A Fable\",\"authors\":\"P. Frijters\",\"doi\":\"10.22459/AG.20.01.2013.05\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Productivity Commission report 'Disability Care and Support' recommends tort liability be replaced by a compulsory, government-run, no-fault scheme. But theory and evidence indicate moving to a no-fault scheme will increase the accident rate. Even a move from non-risk-rated third-party insurance to non-risk-rated first-party insurance reduces incentives for care. A no-fault scheme is not superior to current policies; genuine reform will need to be informed by law and economics literature.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41700,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Agenda-A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform\",\"volume\":\"8 1\",\"pages\":\"71-78\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Agenda-A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.22459/AG.20.01.2013.05\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Agenda-A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22459/AG.20.01.2013.05","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Productivity Commission report 'Disability Care and Support' recommends tort liability be replaced by a compulsory, government-run, no-fault scheme. But theory and evidence indicate moving to a no-fault scheme will increase the accident rate. Even a move from non-risk-rated third-party insurance to non-risk-rated first-party insurance reduces incentives for care. A no-fault scheme is not superior to current policies; genuine reform will need to be informed by law and economics literature.
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