酒店待机升级计划的战略行为:经验证据和定价含义

IF 0.1 4区 工程技术 Q4 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING
Övünç Yılmaz, Mark E. Ferguson, Pelin Pekgün, Guangzhi Shang
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引用次数: 2

摘要

最近,许多酒店开始在完成预订后提供数字化的客房升级服务,以取代传统的前台在入住时的追加销售。“待机升级”——一种基于可用性的打折高级房间升级——就是一个很好的例子。然而,顾客,尤其是忠诚会员,可能会通过与这项技术的反复互动,了解待机升级,并采取战略行动,例如,最初选择标准间,期望通过待机升级获得优质客房折扣。因此,酒店在享受该计划带来的好处的同时,可能会因为这种战略行为而面临溢价销售的潜在蚕食,需要相应地调整价格。利用一家大型连锁酒店16个月的预订和待机升级数据,我们实证调查了待机升级背景下战略客户的存在和程度。在展示了潜在战略行为的初步证据之后,我们开发了一个最大似然估计器来估计战略性客户的百分比。这个估算器通过sequential Logit Model捕获客户备用升级决策的顺序性质(预订决策、单击备用升级优惠和请求升级)。我们在调查的八家酒店中有三家发现了战略行为的证据。考虑到弱形式和强形式的战略行为,我们的估计表明,12%至42%的忠诚客户在这三种属性中都采取了战略行为。然后,我们提出了一个新的定价政策,以帮助酒店经营者从直接预订和待机升级请求中最大化他们的高级客房收入。该策略建议提供全价折扣,但也为忠诚客户提供更高的待机升级价格,这可以使收入比忽略战略行为的策略提高19%,比假设所有客户都是战略客户的策略提高34%——这是两个合理的基准,而没有估计战略客户的比例。因此,我们的研究提供了酒店在采用颠覆性数字技术时可能面临的潜在客户行为挑战的见解,以及如何调整现有政策以使技术取得成功。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Strategic Behavior for Hotel Standby Upgrade Programs: Empirical Evidence and Pricing Implications
Many hotels have recently started to offer room upgrades digitally after the completion of booking to replace traditional front-desk upselling during check-in. Quickly becoming popular for upselling the premium room inventory that may otherwise go unused, "standby upgrade" -- an availability-based, discounted premium room upgrade -- is a prominent example. However, customers, in particular loyalty members, may become knowledgeable about standby upgrades through repeated interactions with this technology, and act strategically, i.e., initially choose a standard room with the expectation of being offered a premium room discount through standby upgrades. Consequently, while enjoying the benefits of this program, hotels may face the potential cannibalization of premium sales due to such strategic behavior and need to adjust their pricing accordingly. Using a major hotel chain's 16-month booking and standby upgrades data, we empirically investigate the existence and extent of strategic customers in the context of standby upgrades. After showing preliminary evidence of potential strategic behavior, we develop a maximum likelihood estimator to estimate the percentage of customers who are strategic. This estimator captures the sequential nature of customer decision-making for standby upgrades (booking decision, clicking the standby upgrades offer, and requesting an upgrade) through a Sequential Logit Model. We find evidence of strategic behavior in three (out of eight) hotels examined. Considering both a weak-form and a strong-form strategic behavior, our estimates suggest that 12% to 42% of the loyalty customers act strategically in these three properties. We then propose a new pricing policy to help hoteliers maximize their premium room revenues from direct bookings and standby upgrade requests. This policy recommends a discounted full price, but also a higher standby upgrade price for loyalty customers, which can bring a revenue improvement of up to 19% over a policy ignoring the strategic behavior and 34% over a policy assuming that all customers are strategic -- two reasonable benchmarks without an estimate of the fraction of strategic customers. Our research, thus, provides insights on the potential customer behavioral challenges that a hotel may face with the adoption of a disruptive digital technology, and how existing policies may need to be adjusted for the technology to be successful.
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来源期刊
Manufacturing Engineering
Manufacturing Engineering 工程技术-工程:制造
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审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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