企业社会责任和非审计服务费

IF 1.4 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
J. Hao, Fei Kang, C. Lee
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本研究探讨企业社会责任(CSR)与非审计服务(NAS)购买之间的关系。由于利益相关者与管理者之间的信息不对称,利益相关者普遍关注审计师的独立性和事务所的报告质量。我们认为,参与企业社会责任的企业更关心满足利益相关者的期望和保护其社会责任的声誉;因此,由于担心影响审计质量,他们倾向于较少购买NAS。与我们的论点一致,我们发现企业社会责任评级越高,NAS费用越低。我们还发现,对于面临更大利益相关者需求、更关注声誉和面临更高诉讼风险的公司,CSR-NAS费用的负相关关系更强。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Corporate social responsibility and non-audit service fees
ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the purchase of non-audit service (NAS). Due to the information asymmetry between stakeholders and managers, stakeholders are generally concerned about auditor’s independence and the firms’ reporting quality. We argue that firms engaging in CSR are more concerned about meeting stakeholder expectations and protecting their reputation of being socially responsible; therefore, they tend to purchase less NAS due to the concern of impaired audit quality. Consistent with our argument, we find that firms with higher CSR ratings incur lower NAS fees. We also document that the negative association of CSR-NAS fees is stronger for firms facing greater stakeholder demand, those with more reputation concerns, and those subject to higher litigation risk.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
9.10%
发文量
39
期刊介绍: The Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics (APJAE) is an international forum intended for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of economics and accounting in general. In particular, the journal encourages submissions in the following areas: Auditing, financial reporting, earnings management, financial analysts, the role of accounting information, international trade and finance, industrial organization, strategic behavior, market structure, financial contracts, corporate governance, capital markets, and financial institutions. The journal welcomes contributions related to the Asia Pacific region, and targets top quality research from scholars with diverse regional interests. The editors encourage submission of high quality manuscripts with innovative ideas. The editorial team is committed to an expedient review process.
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