{"title":"基于超图切算法的电网网络安全分析","authors":"Y. Yamaguchi, Anna Ogawa, A. Takeda, S. Iwata","doi":"10.1109/SmartGridComm.2014.7007750","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents exact solution methods for analyzing vulnerability of electric power networks to a certain kind of undetectable attacks known as false data injection attacks. We show that the problems of finding the minimum number of measurement points to be attacked undetectably reduce to minimum cut problems on hypergraphs, which admit efficient combinatorial algorithms. Experimental results indicate that our exact solution methods run as fast as the previous methods, most of which provide only approximate solutions. We also present the outline of an algorithm for enumerating all small cuts in a hypergraph, which can be used for finding vulnerable sets of measurement points.","PeriodicalId":6499,"journal":{"name":"2014 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)","volume":"8 1","pages":"824-829"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"26","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cyber security analysis of power networks by hypergraph cut algorithms\",\"authors\":\"Y. Yamaguchi, Anna Ogawa, A. Takeda, S. Iwata\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SmartGridComm.2014.7007750\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper presents exact solution methods for analyzing vulnerability of electric power networks to a certain kind of undetectable attacks known as false data injection attacks. We show that the problems of finding the minimum number of measurement points to be attacked undetectably reduce to minimum cut problems on hypergraphs, which admit efficient combinatorial algorithms. Experimental results indicate that our exact solution methods run as fast as the previous methods, most of which provide only approximate solutions. We also present the outline of an algorithm for enumerating all small cuts in a hypergraph, which can be used for finding vulnerable sets of measurement points.\",\"PeriodicalId\":6499,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2014 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)\",\"volume\":\"8 1\",\"pages\":\"824-829\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"26\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2014 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2014.7007750\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2014 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2014.7007750","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Cyber security analysis of power networks by hypergraph cut algorithms
This paper presents exact solution methods for analyzing vulnerability of electric power networks to a certain kind of undetectable attacks known as false data injection attacks. We show that the problems of finding the minimum number of measurement points to be attacked undetectably reduce to minimum cut problems on hypergraphs, which admit efficient combinatorial algorithms. Experimental results indicate that our exact solution methods run as fast as the previous methods, most of which provide only approximate solutions. We also present the outline of an algorithm for enumerating all small cuts in a hypergraph, which can be used for finding vulnerable sets of measurement points.