A Low-Overhead and High-Security Cryptographic Circuit Design Utilizing the TIGFET-Based Three-Phase Single-Rail Pulse Register against Side-Channel Attacks

Side-channel attack (SCA) reveals confidential information by statistically analyzing physical manifestations, which is the serious threat to cryptographic circuits. Various SCA circuit-level countermeasures have been proposed as fundamental solutions to reduce the side-channel vulnerabilities of cryptographic implementations; however, such approaches introduce non-negligible power and area overheads. Among all of the circuit components, flip-flops are the main source of information leakage. This article proposes a three-phase single-rail pulse register (TSPR) based on the three-independent-gate field effect transistor (TIGFET) to achieve all desired properties with improved metrics of area and security. TIGFET-based TSPR consumes a constant power (MCV is 0.25%), has a low delay (12 ps), and employs only 10 TIGFET devices, which is applicable for the low-overhead and high-security cryptographic circuit design compared to the existing flip-flops. In addition, a set of TIGFET-based combinational basic gates are designed to reduce the area occupation and power consumption as much as possible. As a proof of concept, a simplified advanced encryption algorithm (AES), SM4 block cipher algorithm (SM4), and light-weight cryptographic algorithm (PRESENT) are built with the TIGFET-based library. SCA is implemented on the cryptographic implementations to prove its SCA resilience, and the SCA results show that the correct key of cryptographic circuits with TIGFET-based TSPRs is not guessed within 2,000 power traces.