{"title":"随机Oracle模型中基于二叉树的前向安全签名方案","authors":"M. Jurkiewicz","doi":"10.24425/ijet.2021.137868","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"—In this paper we construct and consider a new group-based digital signature scheme with evolving secret key, which is built using a bilinear map. This map is an asymmetric pairing of Type 3, and although, for the reason of this paper, it is treated in a completely abstract fashion it ought to be viewed as being actually defined over E ( F q n )[ p ] × E ( F q nk )[ p ] → F q nk [ p ] . The crucial element of the scheme is the key updater algorithm. With the adoption of pairings and binary trees where a number of leaves is the same as a number of time periods, we are assured that an updated secret key can not be used to recover any of its predecessors. This, in consequence, means that the scheme is forward-secure. To formally justify this assertion, we conduct analysis in fu - cma security model by reducing the security of the scheme to the computational hardness of solving the Weak ℓ -th Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem type. We define this problem and explain why it can be treated as a source of security for cryptographic schemes. As for the reduction itself, in general case, it could be possible to make only in the random oracle model.","PeriodicalId":13158,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"89 4 1","pages":"1505"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Binary Tree Based Forward Secure Signature Scheme in the Random Oracle Model\",\"authors\":\"M. Jurkiewicz\",\"doi\":\"10.24425/ijet.2021.137868\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"—In this paper we construct and consider a new group-based digital signature scheme with evolving secret key, which is built using a bilinear map. This map is an asymmetric pairing of Type 3, and although, for the reason of this paper, it is treated in a completely abstract fashion it ought to be viewed as being actually defined over E ( F q n )[ p ] × E ( F q nk )[ p ] → F q nk [ p ] . The crucial element of the scheme is the key updater algorithm. With the adoption of pairings and binary trees where a number of leaves is the same as a number of time periods, we are assured that an updated secret key can not be used to recover any of its predecessors. This, in consequence, means that the scheme is forward-secure. To formally justify this assertion, we conduct analysis in fu - cma security model by reducing the security of the scheme to the computational hardness of solving the Weak ℓ -th Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem type. We define this problem and explain why it can be treated as a source of security for cryptographic schemes. As for the reduction itself, in general case, it could be possible to make only in the random oracle model.\",\"PeriodicalId\":13158,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.\",\"volume\":\"89 4 1\",\"pages\":\"1505\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.24425/ijet.2021.137868\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.24425/ijet.2021.137868","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
在本文中,我们构造并考虑了一种新的基于群的具有演化密钥的数字签名方案,该方案使用双线性映射构造。这个映射是类型3的非对称配对,尽管由于本文的原因,它以完全抽象的方式处理,但它应该被视为实际上定义在E (F q n)[p] × E (F q nk)[p]→F q nk [p]上。该方案的关键是密钥更新算法。通过采用配对和二叉树,其中叶子的数量与时间段的数量相同,我们可以确保更新的密钥不能用于恢复其前任的任何密钥。因此,这意味着该方案是前向安全的。为了正式证明这一断言,我们在fu - cma安全模型中进行了分析,将该方案的安全性降低到求解弱i -th双线性Diffie-Hellman反演问题类型的计算硬度。我们定义了这个问题,并解释了为什么它可以被视为加密方案的安全来源。至于缩减本身,在一般情况下,它可能只在随机oracle模型中进行。
Binary Tree Based Forward Secure Signature Scheme in the Random Oracle Model
—In this paper we construct and consider a new group-based digital signature scheme with evolving secret key, which is built using a bilinear map. This map is an asymmetric pairing of Type 3, and although, for the reason of this paper, it is treated in a completely abstract fashion it ought to be viewed as being actually defined over E ( F q n )[ p ] × E ( F q nk )[ p ] → F q nk [ p ] . The crucial element of the scheme is the key updater algorithm. With the adoption of pairings and binary trees where a number of leaves is the same as a number of time periods, we are assured that an updated secret key can not be used to recover any of its predecessors. This, in consequence, means that the scheme is forward-secure. To formally justify this assertion, we conduct analysis in fu - cma security model by reducing the security of the scheme to the computational hardness of solving the Weak ℓ -th Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem type. We define this problem and explain why it can be treated as a source of security for cryptographic schemes. As for the reduction itself, in general case, it could be possible to make only in the random oracle model.