{"title":"俄罗斯能源改革及其对欧洲能源安全的影响","authors":"R. F. Price","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.4.390-407","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Russian natural gas and power industries are currently undergoing a reform that has potentially far-reaching consequences for Europe's gas supply and energy security. After fifteen years of subsidizing domestic industry through the regulation of natural gas and electricity prices, the Russian government has embarked on an ambitious program of price deregulation that will result in free market pricing for domestic industrial consumers by 2011. This program has involved many politically difficult decisions about the best use of Russia's comparative advantage in indigenous energy resources and the state's responsibility for the support of the national economy through the subsidy of domestic industry. It has also highlighted a complex identity within Gazprom and revealed that its relationship with the Kremlin is not as harmonious as one might expect.Conceived as a national champion company by the Russian government, which holds a majority of its stock, Gazprom has been expected not only to provide cheap supplies of natural gas to support the development of Russian industry but to secure Russian government interests in international business. However, despite their close relationship to President Putin, Gazprom's CEO, Aleksei Miller, and Chairman, Dmitry Medvedev, have been showing greater concern for Gazprom's profitability and survival and have been giving greater consideration to how macroeconomic factors influence the profitability of industry and the sustainability of economic development. Arguing that cheap electricity, and the need for an abudance of cheap natural gas to supply cheap electricity, was actually a hindrance to healthy domestic development, Gapzrom has successfully persuaded the government to abandon price regulation in favor of a free energy market. Although domestic price reform was a key recommendation of the World Trade Organization for Russia's admittance, the final program won by Gazprom is far more ambitious. Furthermore, Russia's entry still faces many hurdles and is far from imminent. It may even be delayed until after 2008 and may be deprioritized by Putin's successor. Therefore, Russia has demonstrated a great sense of responsibility in addressing its energy-wasteful practices immediately, and has demonstrated responsible recognition of its best long-term interests.Gazprom's long-term production capacity has been a source of concern both domestically and internationally. Output at Gazprom's main producing fields in the Nadym Par Taz (NPT) region-including the supergiant fields of Urengoy, Yamburg, and Medvezhe-has been in steep decline since the early 2000s. By 2015, production at these fields will be half their peak output. To replace this diminishing output, Gazprom has been developing shallow fields in the Ob and Taz Bays on the Yamal Peninsula. While these shallow fields can complement output from NPT, adequate future supplies can only be guaranteed through the development of major new fields, a move that Gazprom has been reluctant to undertake. The Shtokman project has been continuously delayed and development of the giant Yamal Peninsula fields is still in the discussion stages. Despite pressure from the Russian government and expression of deep concern from European customers, Gazprom has resisted these major development projects because of their high marginal costs and uncertainty over future domestic and international prices.The domestic market has traditionally been a financial liability for Gazprom. Despite absorbing approximately 60 percent of Gazprom's output, the company have never realized a profit from sales within Russia. Instead, Gazprom relies on exports to European markets for its entire profit margin. Recently, Gazprom has lost more than $1 billion per year. While this has been somewhat sustainable over the past twenty years, as no new significant development has been necessary, the growing shortfall and the high marginal costs necessary to guarantee future supply to both domestic and foreign markets have caused Gazprom to rebel against its continued subsidization of the domestic market. …","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"17 1","pages":"391"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Energy Reform in Russia and the Implications for European Energy Security\",\"authors\":\"R. F. Price\",\"doi\":\"10.3200/DEMO.15.4.390-407\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Russian natural gas and power industries are currently undergoing a reform that has potentially far-reaching consequences for Europe's gas supply and energy security. After fifteen years of subsidizing domestic industry through the regulation of natural gas and electricity prices, the Russian government has embarked on an ambitious program of price deregulation that will result in free market pricing for domestic industrial consumers by 2011. This program has involved many politically difficult decisions about the best use of Russia's comparative advantage in indigenous energy resources and the state's responsibility for the support of the national economy through the subsidy of domestic industry. It has also highlighted a complex identity within Gazprom and revealed that its relationship with the Kremlin is not as harmonious as one might expect.Conceived as a national champion company by the Russian government, which holds a majority of its stock, Gazprom has been expected not only to provide cheap supplies of natural gas to support the development of Russian industry but to secure Russian government interests in international business. However, despite their close relationship to President Putin, Gazprom's CEO, Aleksei Miller, and Chairman, Dmitry Medvedev, have been showing greater concern for Gazprom's profitability and survival and have been giving greater consideration to how macroeconomic factors influence the profitability of industry and the sustainability of economic development. Arguing that cheap electricity, and the need for an abudance of cheap natural gas to supply cheap electricity, was actually a hindrance to healthy domestic development, Gapzrom has successfully persuaded the government to abandon price regulation in favor of a free energy market. Although domestic price reform was a key recommendation of the World Trade Organization for Russia's admittance, the final program won by Gazprom is far more ambitious. Furthermore, Russia's entry still faces many hurdles and is far from imminent. It may even be delayed until after 2008 and may be deprioritized by Putin's successor. Therefore, Russia has demonstrated a great sense of responsibility in addressing its energy-wasteful practices immediately, and has demonstrated responsible recognition of its best long-term interests.Gazprom's long-term production capacity has been a source of concern both domestically and internationally. Output at Gazprom's main producing fields in the Nadym Par Taz (NPT) region-including the supergiant fields of Urengoy, Yamburg, and Medvezhe-has been in steep decline since the early 2000s. By 2015, production at these fields will be half their peak output. To replace this diminishing output, Gazprom has been developing shallow fields in the Ob and Taz Bays on the Yamal Peninsula. While these shallow fields can complement output from NPT, adequate future supplies can only be guaranteed through the development of major new fields, a move that Gazprom has been reluctant to undertake. 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引用次数: 10
摘要
俄罗斯天然气和电力行业目前正在进行改革,这可能对欧洲的天然气供应和能源安全产生深远影响。经过15年通过管制天然气和电力价格补贴国内工业之后,俄罗斯政府开始了一项雄心勃勃的价格放松管制计划,该计划将在2011年之前实现国内工业消费者的自由市场定价。该计划涉及许多政治上困难的决定,包括如何最好地利用俄罗斯在本土能源资源方面的比较优势,以及国家通过补贴国内产业来支持国民经济的责任。这也突显出俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司内部复杂的身份认同,并揭示出该公司与克里姆林宫的关系并不像人们可能预期的那样和谐。俄罗斯政府持有俄罗斯天然气工业股份有限公司的大部分股份,认为该公司是一家国家冠军企业。人们一直期望该公司不仅提供廉价的天然气供应,以支持俄罗斯工业的发展,还能确保俄罗斯政府在国际业务中的利益。然而,尽管与普京总统关系密切,Gazprom的首席执行官阿列克谢·米勒(Aleksei Miller)和董事长德米特里·梅德韦杰夫(Dmitry Medvedev)对Gazprom的盈利能力和生存表现出了更大的关注,并更多地考虑了宏观经济因素如何影响工业盈利能力和经济发展的可持续性。Gapzrom认为,廉价电力,以及对大量廉价天然气供应廉价电力的需求,实际上是国内健康发展的障碍。Gapzrom已成功说服政府放弃价格管制,支持自由能源市场。尽管国内价格改革是世界贸易组织(World Trade Organization)为让俄罗斯加入世贸组织而提出的一项关键建议,但俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司赢得的最终项目要雄心勃勃得多。此外,俄罗斯的加入仍面临许多障碍,而且远未迫在眉睫。它甚至可能被推迟到2008年之后,并可能被普京的继任者剥夺优先权。因此,俄罗斯在立即解决其能源浪费行为方面表现出了极大的责任感,并表现出对其最佳长期利益的负责任的认识。俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司的长期生产能力一直是国内外关注的焦点。俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司在Nadym Par Taz (NPT)地区的主要生产油田——包括Urengoy、Yamburg和medvezhee的超大型油田——的产量自21世纪初以来一直在急剧下降。到2015年,这些油田的产量将只有峰值产量的一半。为了弥补日益减少的产量,俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司一直在亚马尔半岛的鄂毕湾和塔兹湾开发浅层油田。虽然这些浅层油田可以补充NPT的产量,但只有通过开发大型新油田才能保证充足的未来供应,而Gazprom一直不愿采取这一举措。什托克曼项目一直被推迟,亚马尔半岛巨大油田的开发仍处于讨论阶段。尽管俄罗斯政府施加了压力,欧洲客户也表达了深切的担忧,但俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司拒绝了这些大型开发项目,因为它们的边际成本很高,而且未来国内和国际价格存在不确定性。传统上,国内市场一直是俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司的财务负担。尽管吸收了俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司约60%的产量,但该公司从未从俄罗斯国内的销售中获利。相反,俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司的全部利润率都依赖对欧洲市场的出口。最近,Gazprom每年亏损超过10亿美元。虽然在过去的20年里,由于没有必要进行新的重大开发,这种情况在一定程度上是可持续的,但日益增长的短缺和保证未来向国内外市场供应所必需的高边际成本,导致俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司反对继续补贴国内市场。...
Energy Reform in Russia and the Implications for European Energy Security
The Russian natural gas and power industries are currently undergoing a reform that has potentially far-reaching consequences for Europe's gas supply and energy security. After fifteen years of subsidizing domestic industry through the regulation of natural gas and electricity prices, the Russian government has embarked on an ambitious program of price deregulation that will result in free market pricing for domestic industrial consumers by 2011. This program has involved many politically difficult decisions about the best use of Russia's comparative advantage in indigenous energy resources and the state's responsibility for the support of the national economy through the subsidy of domestic industry. It has also highlighted a complex identity within Gazprom and revealed that its relationship with the Kremlin is not as harmonious as one might expect.Conceived as a national champion company by the Russian government, which holds a majority of its stock, Gazprom has been expected not only to provide cheap supplies of natural gas to support the development of Russian industry but to secure Russian government interests in international business. However, despite their close relationship to President Putin, Gazprom's CEO, Aleksei Miller, and Chairman, Dmitry Medvedev, have been showing greater concern for Gazprom's profitability and survival and have been giving greater consideration to how macroeconomic factors influence the profitability of industry and the sustainability of economic development. Arguing that cheap electricity, and the need for an abudance of cheap natural gas to supply cheap electricity, was actually a hindrance to healthy domestic development, Gapzrom has successfully persuaded the government to abandon price regulation in favor of a free energy market. Although domestic price reform was a key recommendation of the World Trade Organization for Russia's admittance, the final program won by Gazprom is far more ambitious. Furthermore, Russia's entry still faces many hurdles and is far from imminent. It may even be delayed until after 2008 and may be deprioritized by Putin's successor. Therefore, Russia has demonstrated a great sense of responsibility in addressing its energy-wasteful practices immediately, and has demonstrated responsible recognition of its best long-term interests.Gazprom's long-term production capacity has been a source of concern both domestically and internationally. Output at Gazprom's main producing fields in the Nadym Par Taz (NPT) region-including the supergiant fields of Urengoy, Yamburg, and Medvezhe-has been in steep decline since the early 2000s. By 2015, production at these fields will be half their peak output. To replace this diminishing output, Gazprom has been developing shallow fields in the Ob and Taz Bays on the Yamal Peninsula. While these shallow fields can complement output from NPT, adequate future supplies can only be guaranteed through the development of major new fields, a move that Gazprom has been reluctant to undertake. The Shtokman project has been continuously delayed and development of the giant Yamal Peninsula fields is still in the discussion stages. Despite pressure from the Russian government and expression of deep concern from European customers, Gazprom has resisted these major development projects because of their high marginal costs and uncertainty over future domestic and international prices.The domestic market has traditionally been a financial liability for Gazprom. Despite absorbing approximately 60 percent of Gazprom's output, the company have never realized a profit from sales within Russia. Instead, Gazprom relies on exports to European markets for its entire profit margin. Recently, Gazprom has lost more than $1 billion per year. While this has been somewhat sustainable over the past twenty years, as no new significant development has been necessary, the growing shortfall and the high marginal costs necessary to guarantee future supply to both domestic and foreign markets have caused Gazprom to rebel against its continued subsidization of the domestic market. …
DemokratizatsiyaSocial Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍:
Occupying a unique niche among literary journals, ANQ is filled with short, incisive research-based articles about the literature of the English-speaking world and the language of literature. Contributors unravel obscure allusions, explain sources and analogues, and supply variant manuscript readings. Also included are Old English word studies, textual emendations, and rare correspondence from neglected archives. The journal is an essential source for professors and students, as well as archivists, bibliographers, biographers, editors, lexicographers, and textual scholars. With subjects from Chaucer and Milton to Fitzgerald and Welty, ANQ delves into the heart of literature.