D. Sharma, Vineeta D. Sharma, Paul N. Tanyi, Xiaoyan Cheng
{"title":"审计委员会董事是否应在多个审计委员会任职?来自股本成本的证据","authors":"D. Sharma, Vineeta D. Sharma, Paul N. Tanyi, Xiaoyan Cheng","doi":"10.2308/ajpt-17-117","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n We find a significant negative association between cost of equity and audit committee directors' simultaneous service on multiple audit committees (ACNUM). However, this association is not linear, as we find that cost of equity begins to increase when ACNUM is 1.50 for non-retired directors compared to 3.50 for retired directors. Further analyses reveal the negative association is more pronounced when a firm's information environment is strong and widely used firm-level measures of multiple directorships are not related to cost of equity. The evidence we present is consistent with the notion that investors positively perceive audit committee directors' service on multiple audit committees, but only to the extent such service does not undermine directors' ability to effectively discharge their governance responsibilities. Our study informs policymakers, boards, and nominating committees and advances the literature on multiple directorships, audit committees, and cost of equity.\n JEL Classifications: G12; G14; M40; M41.\n Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Should Audit Committee Directors Serve on Multiple Audit Committees? Evidence from Cost of Equity Capital\",\"authors\":\"D. Sharma, Vineeta D. Sharma, Paul N. Tanyi, Xiaoyan Cheng\",\"doi\":\"10.2308/ajpt-17-117\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n We find a significant negative association between cost of equity and audit committee directors' simultaneous service on multiple audit committees (ACNUM). However, this association is not linear, as we find that cost of equity begins to increase when ACNUM is 1.50 for non-retired directors compared to 3.50 for retired directors. Further analyses reveal the negative association is more pronounced when a firm's information environment is strong and widely used firm-level measures of multiple directorships are not related to cost of equity. The evidence we present is consistent with the notion that investors positively perceive audit committee directors' service on multiple audit committees, but only to the extent such service does not undermine directors' ability to effectively discharge their governance responsibilities. Our study informs policymakers, boards, and nominating committees and advances the literature on multiple directorships, audit committees, and cost of equity.\\n JEL Classifications: G12; G14; M40; M41.\\n Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48142,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"10\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-17-117\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-17-117","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Should Audit Committee Directors Serve on Multiple Audit Committees? Evidence from Cost of Equity Capital
We find a significant negative association between cost of equity and audit committee directors' simultaneous service on multiple audit committees (ACNUM). However, this association is not linear, as we find that cost of equity begins to increase when ACNUM is 1.50 for non-retired directors compared to 3.50 for retired directors. Further analyses reveal the negative association is more pronounced when a firm's information environment is strong and widely used firm-level measures of multiple directorships are not related to cost of equity. The evidence we present is consistent with the notion that investors positively perceive audit committee directors' service on multiple audit committees, but only to the extent such service does not undermine directors' ability to effectively discharge their governance responsibilities. Our study informs policymakers, boards, and nominating committees and advances the literature on multiple directorships, audit committees, and cost of equity.
JEL Classifications: G12; G14; M40; M41.
Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.