{"title":"改革,抵抗,……撤退?弗吉尼亚可预见的问责政治","authors":"Frederick M. Hess","doi":"10.1353/PEP.2002.0007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"but the implementation of such regimes produces visible costs that tend to be more politically salient than the accompanying educational benefits. The benefits are diffuse and long-term while the costs are immediate and concentrated, creating a political dynamic that tends to aid critics of highstakes accountability.3 The Allure of Outcome Accountability In seeking to ensure school quality, policymakers have two fundamental methods at their disposal. The traditional approach has been to govern by focusing on the inputs, instead of on the outcomes, of schooling. Policymakers often seek to ensure school quality by requiring that schools spend specified amounts of money per pupil, have facilities that meet set criteria, employ teachers with certain certifications, and so on. Because inputs may not be used in a way that translates into results, input monitoring is characterized by regulation and micromanagement. Public schools and school personnel have traditionally been judged on the basis of whether or not they comply with regulations and mandates governing inputs. Policymakers have evaluated schools based upon their fealty to policy directives, not upon student performance or progress. In large part, this approach emerged as a lowest common denominator compromise among policymakers reluctant to resolve disputes about the relative merit of com71 Frederick M. Hess *F.Hess 2/22/02 10:13 AM Page 71","PeriodicalId":9272,"journal":{"name":"Brookings Papers on Education Policy","volume":"74 1","pages":"122 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"26","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Reform, Resistance,. .. Retreat? The Predictable Politics of Accountability in Virginia\",\"authors\":\"Frederick M. Hess\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/PEP.2002.0007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"but the implementation of such regimes produces visible costs that tend to be more politically salient than the accompanying educational benefits. The benefits are diffuse and long-term while the costs are immediate and concentrated, creating a political dynamic that tends to aid critics of highstakes accountability.3 The Allure of Outcome Accountability In seeking to ensure school quality, policymakers have two fundamental methods at their disposal. The traditional approach has been to govern by focusing on the inputs, instead of on the outcomes, of schooling. Policymakers often seek to ensure school quality by requiring that schools spend specified amounts of money per pupil, have facilities that meet set criteria, employ teachers with certain certifications, and so on. Because inputs may not be used in a way that translates into results, input monitoring is characterized by regulation and micromanagement. Public schools and school personnel have traditionally been judged on the basis of whether or not they comply with regulations and mandates governing inputs. Policymakers have evaluated schools based upon their fealty to policy directives, not upon student performance or progress. In large part, this approach emerged as a lowest common denominator compromise among policymakers reluctant to resolve disputes about the relative merit of com71 Frederick M. Hess *F.Hess 2/22/02 10:13 AM Page 71\",\"PeriodicalId\":9272,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Brookings Papers on Education Policy\",\"volume\":\"74 1\",\"pages\":\"122 - 69\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"26\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Brookings Papers on Education Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/PEP.2002.0007\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Brookings Papers on Education Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/PEP.2002.0007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26
摘要
但是,这种制度的实施会产生明显的成本,这些成本往往比随之而来的教育效益在政治上更为突出。收益是分散和长期的,而成本是直接和集中的,创造了一种政治动态,往往有助于批评高风险问责制在寻求确保学校质量的过程中,政策制定者有两种基本方法可供选择。传统的管理方法是关注教育的投入,而不是结果。政策制定者通常通过要求学校在每个学生身上投入特定数额的资金,拥有符合既定标准的设施,雇佣具有特定证书的教师,等等来确保学校质量。由于投入可能无法转化为结果,因此投入监测的特点是管制和微观管理。传统上,评判公立学校和学校人员的标准是他们是否遵守管理投入的法规和命令。政策制定者评估学校的依据是学校对政策指示的忠诚,而不是学生的表现或进步。在很大程度上,这种方法是政策制定者不愿解决有关欧盟相对优势的争议的最低公分母妥协。Hess 2/22/02 10:13 AM 71页
Reform, Resistance,. .. Retreat? The Predictable Politics of Accountability in Virginia
but the implementation of such regimes produces visible costs that tend to be more politically salient than the accompanying educational benefits. The benefits are diffuse and long-term while the costs are immediate and concentrated, creating a political dynamic that tends to aid critics of highstakes accountability.3 The Allure of Outcome Accountability In seeking to ensure school quality, policymakers have two fundamental methods at their disposal. The traditional approach has been to govern by focusing on the inputs, instead of on the outcomes, of schooling. Policymakers often seek to ensure school quality by requiring that schools spend specified amounts of money per pupil, have facilities that meet set criteria, employ teachers with certain certifications, and so on. Because inputs may not be used in a way that translates into results, input monitoring is characterized by regulation and micromanagement. Public schools and school personnel have traditionally been judged on the basis of whether or not they comply with regulations and mandates governing inputs. Policymakers have evaluated schools based upon their fealty to policy directives, not upon student performance or progress. In large part, this approach emerged as a lowest common denominator compromise among policymakers reluctant to resolve disputes about the relative merit of com71 Frederick M. Hess *F.Hess 2/22/02 10:13 AM Page 71