{"title":"sas142商誉核销的经济后果","authors":"H. Jarva","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-629X.2012.00495.x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:lang=\"en\"> This paper examines the economic consequences of goodwill write-offs under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 142). Although write-off firms have performed poorly, it is evident that deteriorating economic performance explains only a small proportion of write-offs. After controlling for endogeneity of write-off choice, I fail to find evidence that investors and analysts fixate on SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. I also provide evidence that write-off firms pay higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors charge higher fees in response to extra audit effort. These results are consistent with the principles of market efficiency, analyst-forecast rationality and efficient audit pricing.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"19","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Economic Consequences of SFAS 142 Goodwill Write‐Offs\",\"authors\":\"H. Jarva\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/j.1467-629X.2012.00495.x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"type=\\\"main\\\" xml:lang=\\\"en\\\"> This paper examines the economic consequences of goodwill write-offs under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 142). Although write-off firms have performed poorly, it is evident that deteriorating economic performance explains only a small proportion of write-offs. After controlling for endogeneity of write-off choice, I fail to find evidence that investors and analysts fixate on SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. I also provide evidence that write-off firms pay higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors charge higher fees in response to extra audit effort. These results are consistent with the principles of market efficiency, analyst-forecast rationality and efficient audit pricing.\",\"PeriodicalId\":23644,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting\",\"volume\":\"67 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"19\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2012.00495.x\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2012.00495.x","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic Consequences of SFAS 142 Goodwill Write‐Offs
type="main" xml:lang="en"> This paper examines the economic consequences of goodwill write-offs under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 142). Although write-off firms have performed poorly, it is evident that deteriorating economic performance explains only a small proportion of write-offs. After controlling for endogeneity of write-off choice, I fail to find evidence that investors and analysts fixate on SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. I also provide evidence that write-off firms pay higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors charge higher fees in response to extra audit effort. These results are consistent with the principles of market efficiency, analyst-forecast rationality and efficient audit pricing.