{"title":"脚注有什么问题?","authors":"John-Paul Spiro","doi":"10.1558/EXPO.V3I2.159","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Should graduate studentsand even many professorsreally be trying to solve the world’s problems before they know enough about their own discipline? Mark C. Taylor disparages academic specialization as “more and more about less and less,” as if specialization requires small-mindedness and lack of intellectual ambition. But specialization is not always-already narrowness; if it were, then the academic collaboration that Taylor extols would entail locking several blinkered professors in a room and hoping they come up with answers to global problems. Could they even communicate with one another in mutually comprehensible terms? If they could, then they would not be what Taylor says they are. If scholars are to band together and use their various forms of expertise to fight, for example, climate change and international conflict, those individual scholars need expertise in their fields in the first place. It is the very nature of “expertise in their fields” that requires further attention. Disciplinary boundaries are problematic and, perhaps increasingly, restricting, but they also serve purposes. Disciplinary norms exist for reasons: they tell us what questions to ask, what methods to use, and what counts as evidence. In Stanley Fish’s characterization, “I am professionally correct, not out of a sense of moral obligation or choice of values … but out of a sense that the structure of a fully articulated profession, be it negligence law or literary criticism, is such that those who enter its precincts will find that the basic decisions, about where to look, what to do, and how to do it, have already been made” (Fish 1995, 44). The average academic professional is not—and should not be—interested in revolutionizing the profession but in simply practicing it, doing what Thomas Kuhn called “normal science,” which “does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none” (Kuhn 1996, 52). Scholars within disciplines apply the latest techniques and theories to the extant data. But it is not clear what will constitute “normal science” under Taylor’s new academic regime. Taylor’s own work is innovative and multidisciplinary in the best ways. His work is distinguished by its range, depth, and its embrace of past, present, and future. 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But specialization is not always-already narrowness; if it were, then the academic collaboration that Taylor extols would entail locking several blinkered professors in a room and hoping they come up with answers to global problems. Could they even communicate with one another in mutually comprehensible terms? If they could, then they would not be what Taylor says they are. If scholars are to band together and use their various forms of expertise to fight, for example, climate change and international conflict, those individual scholars need expertise in their fields in the first place. It is the very nature of “expertise in their fields” that requires further attention. Disciplinary boundaries are problematic and, perhaps increasingly, restricting, but they also serve purposes. Disciplinary norms exist for reasons: they tell us what questions to ask, what methods to use, and what counts as evidence. In Stanley Fish’s characterization, “I am professionally correct, not out of a sense of moral obligation or choice of values … but out of a sense that the structure of a fully articulated profession, be it negligence law or literary criticism, is such that those who enter its precincts will find that the basic decisions, about where to look, what to do, and how to do it, have already been made” (Fish 1995, 44). The average academic professional is not—and should not be—interested in revolutionizing the profession but in simply practicing it, doing what Thomas Kuhn called “normal science,” which “does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none” (Kuhn 1996, 52). Scholars within disciplines apply the latest techniques and theories to the extant data. But it is not clear what will constitute “normal science” under Taylor’s new academic regime. Taylor’s own work is innovative and multidisciplinary in the best ways. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
研究生甚至许多教授真的应该在他们对自己的学科有足够的了解之前就试图解决世界上的问题吗?马克·c·泰勒(Mark C. Taylor)贬低学术专门化为“越来越少,越来越少”,似乎专门化要求心胸狭窄,缺乏学术抱负。但是专业化并不总是狭隘的;如果是这样的话,那么泰勒所歌颂的学术合作将会是把几个目光狭隘的教授关在一个房间里,希望他们能找到解决全球问题的答案。他们甚至可以用相互理解的方式进行交流吗?如果他们可以,那么他们就不是泰勒所说的那样。如果学者们要联合起来,利用他们各种形式的专业知识来对抗,例如气候变化和国际冲突,那么这些学者首先需要各自领域的专业知识。需要进一步关注的正是“各自领域的专业知识”的本质。学科界限是有问题的,而且可能越来越受到限制,但它们也有用途。纪律规范的存在是有原因的:它们告诉我们该问什么问题,用什么方法,什么可以作为证据。在Stanley Fish的描述中,“我在专业上是正确的,不是出于道德义务或价值观的选择……而是出于这样一种感觉,即一个完全明确的职业的结构,无论是疏忽法还是文学批评,都是这样的,那些进入其范围的人会发现基本的决定,关于去哪里看,做什么,以及如何做,已经做出了”(Fish 1995, 44)。一般的学术专业人士对专业革命不感兴趣,也不应该感兴趣,而只是实践它,做托马斯·库恩所说的“常规科学”,“不以事实或理论的新奇为目标,即使成功了,也没有发现任何新奇”(库恩1996,52)。学科内的学者将最新的技术和理论应用于现有的数据。但是,在泰勒的新学术体制下,什么将构成“正常科学”尚不清楚。泰勒自己的作品以最好的方式具有创新性和多学科性。他的作品以其广度、深度以及对过去、现在和未来的包容而著称。他自己也知道这一点:“当我从神学转向哲学
Should graduate studentsand even many professorsreally be trying to solve the world’s problems before they know enough about their own discipline? Mark C. Taylor disparages academic specialization as “more and more about less and less,” as if specialization requires small-mindedness and lack of intellectual ambition. But specialization is not always-already narrowness; if it were, then the academic collaboration that Taylor extols would entail locking several blinkered professors in a room and hoping they come up with answers to global problems. Could they even communicate with one another in mutually comprehensible terms? If they could, then they would not be what Taylor says they are. If scholars are to band together and use their various forms of expertise to fight, for example, climate change and international conflict, those individual scholars need expertise in their fields in the first place. It is the very nature of “expertise in their fields” that requires further attention. Disciplinary boundaries are problematic and, perhaps increasingly, restricting, but they also serve purposes. Disciplinary norms exist for reasons: they tell us what questions to ask, what methods to use, and what counts as evidence. In Stanley Fish’s characterization, “I am professionally correct, not out of a sense of moral obligation or choice of values … but out of a sense that the structure of a fully articulated profession, be it negligence law or literary criticism, is such that those who enter its precincts will find that the basic decisions, about where to look, what to do, and how to do it, have already been made” (Fish 1995, 44). The average academic professional is not—and should not be—interested in revolutionizing the profession but in simply practicing it, doing what Thomas Kuhn called “normal science,” which “does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none” (Kuhn 1996, 52). Scholars within disciplines apply the latest techniques and theories to the extant data. But it is not clear what will constitute “normal science” under Taylor’s new academic regime. Taylor’s own work is innovative and multidisciplinary in the best ways. His work is distinguished by its range, depth, and its embrace of past, present, and future. He knows this of himself: “As I move from theology to philoso