{"title":"不平等和不平等在习俗上的出现","authors":"Calvin T. Cochran, Cailin O’Connor","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19828371","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Many societies have norms of equity – that those who make symmetric social contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per contribution than others. In this article, we draw on evolutionary game theory to show that the emergence of this sort of convention is far from surprising. In simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much more likely to emerge than equity, despite the presence of stable, equitable outcomes that groups might instead learn. As we outline, social groups provide a way to break symmetry between actors in determining both contribution and reward in joint projects.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2019-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Inequality and inequity in the emergence of conventions\",\"authors\":\"Calvin T. Cochran, Cailin O’Connor\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/1470594X19828371\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Many societies have norms of equity – that those who make symmetric social contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per contribution than others. In this article, we draw on evolutionary game theory to show that the emergence of this sort of convention is far from surprising. In simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much more likely to emerge than equity, despite the presence of stable, equitable outcomes that groups might instead learn. As we outline, social groups provide a way to break symmetry between actors in determining both contribution and reward in joint projects.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45971,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Politics Philosophy & Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-02-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Politics Philosophy & Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19828371\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19828371","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Inequality and inequity in the emergence of conventions
Many societies have norms of equity – that those who make symmetric social contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per contribution than others. In this article, we draw on evolutionary game theory to show that the emergence of this sort of convention is far from surprising. In simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much more likely to emerge than equity, despite the presence of stable, equitable outcomes that groups might instead learn. As we outline, social groups provide a way to break symmetry between actors in determining both contribution and reward in joint projects.
期刊介绍:
Politics, Philosophy & Economics aims to bring moral, economic and political theory to bear on the analysis, justification and criticism of political and economic institutions and public policies. The Editors are committed to publishing peer-reviewed papers of high quality using various methodologies from a wide variety of normative perspectives. They seek to provide a distinctive forum for discussions and debates among political scientists, philosophers, and economists on such matters as constitutional design, property rights, distributive justice, the welfare state, egalitarianism, the morals of the market, democratic socialism, population ethics, and the evolution of norms.