信息披露的最后一战?澄清竞选资金披露所带来的“信息利益”的必要性

Lear Jiang
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引用次数: 3

摘要

在竞选财务监管的范围内,信息披露享有独特的地位。这是法院唯一一贯赞成的规定。自巴克利诉法雷奥案以来,法院一直支持信息披露要求,认为其促进了“信息利益”——这一利益的定义非常宽泛,即教育选民了解政治信息背后的赞助者的利益。人们认为,信息披露的信息利益足以抵消其对言论的附带负担,而其他形式的竞选财务监管所带来的利益却未能做到这一点。然而,尽管有善意,但在联合公民案之后,随着反对竞选财务监管的倡导者将注意力转向信息披露,信息披露似乎处于守势。本说明认为,自联合公民以来,法院对披露的信息利益的适用有所不同,该短语已被用于体现披露的信息利益的几个不同方面。这种不一致,再加上越来越多的理论压力,认为披露的教育公众的能力被大大夸大了,使得披露的基础摇摇欲坠的第一修正案。如果不解决,这种不确定性将给各州寻求制定与竞选相关的信息披露法规带来问题。作为回应,本报告建议,更加强调信息披露提升话语权的能力——无论是在产生的言论量还是产生的讨论深度方面——可以为未来的改革提供更有力的理由。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Disclosure's Last Stand? The Need to Clarify the 'Informational Interest' Advanced by Campaign Finance Disclosure
Disclosure enjoys a unique position within the spectrum of campaign finance regulation. It is the only regulation that courts have looked upon with consistent approval. Since Buckley v. Valeo, courts have upheld disclosure requirements as advancing an “informational interest”—very broadly defined as the interest in educating voters about the sponsors behind political messages. Disclosure’s informational interest has been deemed sufficient to outweigh its incidental burdens on speech, something that interests advanced by other forms of campaign finance regulation have failed to do. Yet despite the goodwill, after Citizens United, disclosure seems to be on the defensive as advocates against campaign finance regulation turn their attention to disclosure.

This Note argues that since Citizens United, courts have differed in their application of disclosure’s informational interest and that the phrase has been used to embody several different strands of disclosure’s informative benefits. This inconsistency, compounded with growing theoretical pressures arguing that disclosure’s ability to educate the public is greatly overstated, puts disclosure on shaky First Amendment footing. If left unresolved, this uncertainty presents problems for states seeking to craft campaign-related disclosure statutes. In response, this Note proposes that placing a greater emphasis on disclosure’s ability to elevate discourse—both in terms of the volume of speech that is generated and the depth of the discussion that is produced—can provide a more robust justification for future reform.
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