{"title":"瀑布的尽头——中央交易对手的可解决性","authors":"P. Gárdos","doi":"10.3790/ccm.54.4.505","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n After the prudential requirements introduced by EMIR in 2012, the European Union took a further step when it adopted a regulation in 2021 on the framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties. The regulation is based on the bank recovery and resolution directive of 2014. This paper provides a critical overview of the new regulation by focusing on the question of whether the bank resolution tools are useful and effective in the case of central counterparty resolutions.","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"At the End of the Waterfall – Resolvability of Central Counterparties\",\"authors\":\"P. Gárdos\",\"doi\":\"10.3790/ccm.54.4.505\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n After the prudential requirements introduced by EMIR in 2012, the European Union took a further step when it adopted a regulation in 2021 on the framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties. The regulation is based on the bank recovery and resolution directive of 2014. This paper provides a critical overview of the new regulation by focusing on the question of whether the bank resolution tools are useful and effective in the case of central counterparty resolutions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36966,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Credit and Capital Markets\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Credit and Capital Markets\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.54.4.505\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Credit and Capital Markets","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.54.4.505","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
At the End of the Waterfall – Resolvability of Central Counterparties
After the prudential requirements introduced by EMIR in 2012, the European Union took a further step when it adopted a regulation in 2021 on the framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties. The regulation is based on the bank recovery and resolution directive of 2014. This paper provides a critical overview of the new regulation by focusing on the question of whether the bank resolution tools are useful and effective in the case of central counterparty resolutions.
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