在超巨星的网外生活了七年

Petros Gigis, Matt Calder, Lefteris Manassakis, George Nomikos, Vasileios Kotronis, X. Dimitropoulos, Ethan Katz-Bassett, Georgios Smaragdakis
{"title":"在超巨星的网外生活了七年","authors":"Petros Gigis, Matt Calder, Lefteris Manassakis, George Nomikos, Vasileios Kotronis, X. Dimitropoulos, Ethan Katz-Bassett, Georgios Smaragdakis","doi":"10.1145/3452296.3472928","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Content Hypergiants deliver the vast majority of Internet traffic to end users. In recent years, some have invested heavily in deploying services and servers inside end-user networks. With several dozen Hypergiants and thousands of servers deployed inside networks, these off-net (meaning outside the Hypergiant networks) deployments change the structure of the Internet. Previous efforts to study them have relied on proprietary data or specialized per-Hypergiant measurement techniques that neither scale nor generalize, providing a limited view of content delivery on today's Internet. In this paper, we develop a generic and easy to implement methodology to measure the expansion of Hypergiants' off-nets. Our key observation is that Hypergiants increasingly encrypt their traffic to protect their customers' privacy. Thus, we can analyze publicly available Internet-wide scans of port 443 and retrieve TLS certificates to discover which IP addresses host Hypergiant certificates in order to infer the networks hosting off-nets for the corresponding Hypergiants. Our results show that the number of networks hosting Hypergiant off-nets has tripled from 2013 to 2021, reaching 4.5k networks. The largest Hypergiants dominate these deployments, with almost all of these networks hosting an off-net for at least one -- and increasingly two or more -- of Google, Netflix, Facebook, or Akamai. These four Hypergiants have off-nets within networks that provide access to a significant fraction of end user population.","PeriodicalId":20487,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Conference","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"33","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Seven years in the life of Hypergiants' off-nets\",\"authors\":\"Petros Gigis, Matt Calder, Lefteris Manassakis, George Nomikos, Vasileios Kotronis, X. Dimitropoulos, Ethan Katz-Bassett, Georgios Smaragdakis\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3452296.3472928\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Content Hypergiants deliver the vast majority of Internet traffic to end users. In recent years, some have invested heavily in deploying services and servers inside end-user networks. With several dozen Hypergiants and thousands of servers deployed inside networks, these off-net (meaning outside the Hypergiant networks) deployments change the structure of the Internet. Previous efforts to study them have relied on proprietary data or specialized per-Hypergiant measurement techniques that neither scale nor generalize, providing a limited view of content delivery on today's Internet. In this paper, we develop a generic and easy to implement methodology to measure the expansion of Hypergiants' off-nets. Our key observation is that Hypergiants increasingly encrypt their traffic to protect their customers' privacy. Thus, we can analyze publicly available Internet-wide scans of port 443 and retrieve TLS certificates to discover which IP addresses host Hypergiant certificates in order to infer the networks hosting off-nets for the corresponding Hypergiants. Our results show that the number of networks hosting Hypergiant off-nets has tripled from 2013 to 2021, reaching 4.5k networks. The largest Hypergiants dominate these deployments, with almost all of these networks hosting an off-net for at least one -- and increasingly two or more -- of Google, Netflix, Facebook, or Akamai. These four Hypergiants have off-nets within networks that provide access to a significant fraction of end user population.\",\"PeriodicalId\":20487,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Conference\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"33\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Conference\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3452296.3472928\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Conference","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3452296.3472928","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 33

摘要

内容超级巨头向最终用户提供了绝大多数互联网流量。近年来,一些公司在最终用户网络中投入巨资部署服务和服务器。由于在网络内部部署了几十台Hypergiants和数千台服务器,这些离网(即在Hypergiant网络之外)部署改变了Internet的结构。以前对它们的研究依赖于专有数据或专门的超巨型测量技术,既不能扩展也不能泛化,对当今互联网上的内容交付提供了有限的看法。在本文中,我们开发了一种通用且易于实现的方法来测量Hypergiants的离网扩展。我们的主要观察是,超级巨头越来越多地加密他们的流量,以保护他们的客户隐私。因此,我们可以分析端口443的公开可用的internet范围扫描并检索TLS证书,以发现哪些IP地址承载了Hypergiant证书,从而推断出承载相应Hypergiants的网外网络。我们的结果表明,从2013年到2021年,托管Hypergiant离网的网络数量增加了两倍,达到4.5万个网络。最大的超级巨头主导着这些部署,几乎所有这些网络都至少为谷歌、Netflix、Facebook或Akamai的一个(越来越多的是两个或更多)托管离网服务。这四个超级巨头在网络中都有离网,为很大一部分最终用户提供访问。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Seven years in the life of Hypergiants' off-nets
Content Hypergiants deliver the vast majority of Internet traffic to end users. In recent years, some have invested heavily in deploying services and servers inside end-user networks. With several dozen Hypergiants and thousands of servers deployed inside networks, these off-net (meaning outside the Hypergiant networks) deployments change the structure of the Internet. Previous efforts to study them have relied on proprietary data or specialized per-Hypergiant measurement techniques that neither scale nor generalize, providing a limited view of content delivery on today's Internet. In this paper, we develop a generic and easy to implement methodology to measure the expansion of Hypergiants' off-nets. Our key observation is that Hypergiants increasingly encrypt their traffic to protect their customers' privacy. Thus, we can analyze publicly available Internet-wide scans of port 443 and retrieve TLS certificates to discover which IP addresses host Hypergiant certificates in order to infer the networks hosting off-nets for the corresponding Hypergiants. Our results show that the number of networks hosting Hypergiant off-nets has tripled from 2013 to 2021, reaching 4.5k networks. The largest Hypergiants dominate these deployments, with almost all of these networks hosting an off-net for at least one -- and increasingly two or more -- of Google, Netflix, Facebook, or Akamai. These four Hypergiants have off-nets within networks that provide access to a significant fraction of end user population.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信