董事会中的女性及其对治理和绩效的影响

IF 2.2 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Renée B. Adams, Daniel Ferreira
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引用次数: 4422

摘要

研究表明,女性董事对董事会投入和公司绩效有显著影响。在美国公司的样本中,我们发现女性董事的出勤记录优于男性董事,董事会性别越多样化,男性董事的出勤问题就越少,女性更有可能加入监督委员会。这些结果表明,性别多元化的董事会在监督方面投入了更多精力。因此,我们发现,在董事会性别多元化程度更高的公司,CEO离职率对股票表现更为敏感,董事获得的股权薪酬也更多。然而,性别多样性对公司绩效的平均影响是负面的。这种负面影响是由收购防御较少的公司造成的。我们的研究结果表明,对于治理良好的公司来说,强制性的董事性别配额会降低公司价值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance
We show that female directors have a significant impact on board inputs and firm outcomes. In a sample of US firms, we find that female directors have better attendance records than male directors, male directors have fewer attendance problems the more gender-diverse the board is, and women are more likely to join monitoring committees. These results suggest that gender-diverse boards allocate more effort to monitoring. Accordingly, we find that CEO turnover is more sensitive to stock performance and directors receive more equity-based compensation in firms with more gender-diverse boards. However, the average effect of gender diversity on firm performance is negative. This negative effect is driven by companies with fewer takeover defenses. Our results suggest that mandating gender quotas for directors can reduce firm value for well-governed firms.
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来源期刊
European Journal of Finance
European Journal of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
8.00%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: The European Journal of Finance publishes a full range of research into theoretical and empirical topics in finance. The emphasis is on issues that reflect European interests and concerns. The journal aims to publish work that is motivated by significant issues in the theory or practice of finance. The journal promotes communication between finance academics and practitioners by providing a vehicle for the publication of research into European issues, stimulating research in finance within Europe, encouraging the international exchange of ideas, theories and the practical application of methodologies and playing a positive role in the development of the infrastructure for finance research.
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