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引用次数: 62
摘要
在无证书密码学中,用户密钥由两个部分密钥派生而来:一个是密钥生成中心(key Generation Center, KGC)生成的基于身份的密钥(对应于用户身份),另一个是用户自生成的密钥(对应于用户自生成且未经认证的公钥)。对于无证书加密,可以考虑两种类型的攻击者:Type-I攻击者可以替换用户自生成的公钥(在传输中或在公共目录中),Type-II攻击者是一个诚实但好奇的KGC。本文对无证书密钥交换(CLKE)进行了正式的研究。我们表明,当考虑到对密钥交换协议很重要的前向保密的概念时,传统的Type-I和Type-II安全定义可能不适用于无证书密钥交换。然后,我们提出了一个新的安全模型,其中考虑了单个攻击者(而不是i型和ii型攻击者)。我们还构造了一个不需要昂贵的配对操作的强安全的无证书密钥交换协议。据我们所知,我们提出的协议是第一个经过验证的安全的无需配对的CLKE协议。
Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing
In certificateless cryptography, a user secret key is derived from two partial secrets: one is the identity-based secret key (corresponding to the user identity) generated by a Key Generation Center (KGC), and the other is the user self-generated secret key (corresponding to a user self-generated and uncertified public key). Two types of adversaries are considered for certificateless cryptography: a Type-I adversary who can replace the user self-generated public key (in transmission or in a public directory), and a Type-II adversary who is an honest-but-curious KGC. In this paper, we present a formal study on certificateless key exchange (CLKE). We show that the conventional definition of Type-I and Type-II security may not be suitable for certificateless key exchange when considering the notion of forward secrecy which is important for key exchange protocols. We then present a new security model in which a single adversary (instead of Type-I and Type-II adversaries) is considered. We also construct a strongly secure certificateless key exchange protocol without expensive pairing operations. As far as we know, our proposed protocol is the first proven secure CLKE protocol without pairing.