无浪费的区块链:权益证明

Fahad Saleh
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引用次数: 430

摘要

无许可区块链需要一个协议来产生共识。许多著名的无许可区块链为此目的采用工作量证明(PoW),但PoW具有重大缺点。人们提出了各种替代方案。本文提供了最著名的替代方案——权益证明(PoS)的第一个正式经济模型,并建立了PoS产生共识的条件。一个足够适度的奖励计划不仅意味着存在尽快达成共识的均衡,而且还排除了持久的分叉均衡。出现后一种结果是因为PoS与PoW不同,它要求验证者也是涉众。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Blockchain Without Waste: Proof-of-Stake
Permissionless blockchains require a protocol to generate consensus. Many prominent permissionless blockchains employ Proof-of-Work (PoW) for that purpose, but PoW possesses significant shortcomings. Various alternatives have been proposed. This paper provides the first formal economic model of the most famous alternative, Proof-of-Stake (PoS), and establishes conditions under which PoS generates consensus. A sufficiently modest reward schedule not only implies the existence of an equilibrium in which consensus obtains as soon as possible but also precludes a persistent forking equilibrium. The latter result arises because PoS, unlike PoW, requires that validators are also stakeholders.
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