{"title":"无浪费的区块链:权益证明","authors":"Fahad Saleh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3183935","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Permissionless blockchains require a protocol to generate consensus. Many prominent permissionless blockchains employ Proof-of-Work (PoW) for that purpose, but PoW possesses significant shortcomings. Various alternatives have been proposed. This paper provides the first formal economic model of the most famous alternative, Proof-of-Stake (PoS), and establishes conditions under which PoS generates consensus. A sufficiently modest reward schedule not only implies the existence of an equilibrium in which consensus obtains as soon as possible but also precludes a persistent forking equilibrium. The latter result arises because PoS, unlike PoW, requires that validators are also stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":13594,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"430","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Blockchain Without Waste: Proof-of-Stake\",\"authors\":\"Fahad Saleh\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3183935\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Permissionless blockchains require a protocol to generate consensus. Many prominent permissionless blockchains employ Proof-of-Work (PoW) for that purpose, but PoW possesses significant shortcomings. Various alternatives have been proposed. This paper provides the first formal economic model of the most famous alternative, Proof-of-Stake (PoS), and establishes conditions under which PoS generates consensus. A sufficiently modest reward schedule not only implies the existence of an equilibrium in which consensus obtains as soon as possible but also precludes a persistent forking equilibrium. The latter result arises because PoS, unlike PoW, requires that validators are also stakeholders.\",\"PeriodicalId\":13594,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Information Systems & Economics eJournal\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-07-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"430\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Information Systems & Economics eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3183935\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Information Systems & Economics eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3183935","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Permissionless blockchains require a protocol to generate consensus. Many prominent permissionless blockchains employ Proof-of-Work (PoW) for that purpose, but PoW possesses significant shortcomings. Various alternatives have been proposed. This paper provides the first formal economic model of the most famous alternative, Proof-of-Stake (PoS), and establishes conditions under which PoS generates consensus. A sufficiently modest reward schedule not only implies the existence of an equilibrium in which consensus obtains as soon as possible but also precludes a persistent forking equilibrium. The latter result arises because PoS, unlike PoW, requires that validators are also stakeholders.