{"title":"中国农村选举制度是否反映民意?来自村级选举的证据","authors":"Qi Zhang, Mingxing Liu","doi":"10.1007/s44216-022-00003-9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Drawing on a field survey of 116 villages in rural China conducted by the authors in 2005, we analyze whether and to what extent the official electoral institutions, as administered by local government, were a system that was consistent with the public preferences of villagers. We find a positive correlation between public opinion and actual electoral institutions; that is, if more villagers believed a certain electoral institution was ideal, the probability increased that such an electoral institution was implemented in practical village elections. The opinion-policy linkage, however, suggests that central government interventions and pressure from villagers’ collective protests were more effective than institutionalized and regular deliberations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100130,"journal":{"name":"Asian Review of Political Economy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44216-022-00003-9.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do rural electoral institutions reflect public opinion in China? Evidence from village elections\",\"authors\":\"Qi Zhang, Mingxing Liu\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s44216-022-00003-9\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Drawing on a field survey of 116 villages in rural China conducted by the authors in 2005, we analyze whether and to what extent the official electoral institutions, as administered by local government, were a system that was consistent with the public preferences of villagers. We find a positive correlation between public opinion and actual electoral institutions; that is, if more villagers believed a certain electoral institution was ideal, the probability increased that such an electoral institution was implemented in practical village elections. The opinion-policy linkage, however, suggests that central government interventions and pressure from villagers’ collective protests were more effective than institutionalized and regular deliberations.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":100130,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Asian Review of Political Economy\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-10-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44216-022-00003-9.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Asian Review of Political Economy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44216-022-00003-9\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian Review of Political Economy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44216-022-00003-9","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do rural electoral institutions reflect public opinion in China? Evidence from village elections
Drawing on a field survey of 116 villages in rural China conducted by the authors in 2005, we analyze whether and to what extent the official electoral institutions, as administered by local government, were a system that was consistent with the public preferences of villagers. We find a positive correlation between public opinion and actual electoral institutions; that is, if more villagers believed a certain electoral institution was ideal, the probability increased that such an electoral institution was implemented in practical village elections. The opinion-policy linkage, however, suggests that central government interventions and pressure from villagers’ collective protests were more effective than institutionalized and regular deliberations.