在内容提供商和互联网服务提供商之间缓存游戏

Vaggelis G. Douros, S. Elayoubi, E. Altman, Y. Hayel
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引用次数: 28

摘要

我们考虑这样一个场景:互联网服务提供商(ISP)为在M个内容提供商(CP)中选择数字内容的用户提供服务。在目前的情况下,这些用户既要向ISP支付接入费,又要向每个选择的CP支付内容费;然而,ISP和CPs都没有分享他们的利润。我们通过引入一个不同的业务模型来重新审视这个模型,其中ISP和CP可能有动机在缓存框架中进行协作。关键思想是ISP为CP部署缓存,前提是他们共享部署成本和由于缓存而产生的额外利润。在联盟博弈的棱镜下,我们的贡献包括对公平分配利润的夏普利值的应用,联盟的稳定性分析以及最优缓存策略的封闭形式公式的推导。我们的模型不仅捕获了CPs之间内容不重叠的情况,而且还捕获了内容重叠的更具挑战性的情况;对于后一种情况,引入并分析了CPs之间的非合作博弈,以捕获当部署其他CPs的缓存时特定CP需求的负外部性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Caching games between Content Providers and Internet Service Providers
We consider a scenario where an Internet Service Provider (ISP) serves users that choose digital content among M Content Providers (CP). In the status quo, these users pay both access fees to the ISP and content fees to each chosen CP; however, neither the ISP nor the CPs share their profit. We revisit this model by introducing a different business model where the ISP and the CP may have motivation to collaborate in the framework of caching. The key idea is that the ISP deploys a cache for a CP provided that they share both the deployment cost and the additional profit that arises due to caching. Under the prism of coalitional games, our contributions include the application of the Shap-ley value for a fair splitting of the profit, the stability analysis of the coalition and the derivation of closed-form formulas for the optimal caching policy. Our model captures not only the case of non-overlapping contents among the CPs, but also the more challenging case of overlapping contents; for the latter case, a non-cooperative game among the CPs is introduced and analyzed to capture the negative externality on the demand of a particular CP when caches for other CPs are deployed.
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