央行数字货币:当价格与银行稳定性发生冲突时

L. Schilling, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, H. Uhlig
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引用次数: 60

摘要

基于账户的央行数字货币有可能取代私人银行的活期存款。在这种情况下,央行投资实体经济,并承担期限转换的角色,让存款人分担风险。她作为中介的职能使商业银行面临储户的需求流动性或“支出”冲击。由于活期存款合同是名义上的,高总支出不一定要求央行过度清算实际投资。因此,对中央银行的挤兑可以表现为以过度的实际资产清算(配给)为特征的标准挤兑,也可以表现为少量实际商品供应满足高需求的价格水平挤兑。因此,央行在价格稳定与实体商品过度出清之间权衡取舍。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Central Bank Digital Currency: When Price and Bank Stability Collide
An account-based central bank digital currency has the potential to replace demand-deposits in private banks. In that case, the central bank invests in the real economy and takes over the role of maturity transformation to allow risk-sharing among depositors. Her function as intermediary exposes the CB to demand-liquidity or 'spending' shocks by her depositors. Since demand-deposit contracts are nominal, high aggregate spending not necessarily demands excessive liquidation of real investment by the central bank. A run on a central bank can, therefore, manifest itself either as a standard run characterized by excessive real asset liquidation (rationing) or as a run on the price level where a small supply of real goods meets a high demand. The central bank thus trades off price stability against the excessive liquidation of real goods.
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