P2P网络中资源共享的代理激励研究

Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li
{"title":"P2P网络中资源共享的代理激励研究","authors":"Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li","doi":"10.1142/S0217595921500317","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There have recently been extensive studies on proportional response protocol, which is motivated by the successful BitTorrent system for file sharing over a P2P network. The proportional response protocol has been proved to be strategy-proof against weight cheating attacks and edge cheating attacks, in order to allocate a single type of resource on P2P networks. This strategy-proof property holds due to an elegant combinatorial structure: the bottleneck decomposition of the underlying network structure, and the utility function, defined as the total resources that one agent receives from its neighbors. However, Sybil attacks, under which an agent may form several fictitious players and split its resource among them, have been shown as a more difficult attack to defend against, and thus a strategic agent playing Sybil attacks may result in personal gain. Previous efforts have been made to show that an agent may generate a gain, but with limited gains by Sybil attacks on several special networks, including trees, cliques, and rings. This paper is the first to study the agent’s incentives by adopting a Sybil attack on general networks. The main contribution is to prove that any agent cannot obtain more than three times as much as the revenue when it plays honestly.","PeriodicalId":8478,"journal":{"name":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Study on Agent Incentives for Resource Sharing on P2P Networks\",\"authors\":\"Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/S0217595921500317\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"There have recently been extensive studies on proportional response protocol, which is motivated by the successful BitTorrent system for file sharing over a P2P network. The proportional response protocol has been proved to be strategy-proof against weight cheating attacks and edge cheating attacks, in order to allocate a single type of resource on P2P networks. This strategy-proof property holds due to an elegant combinatorial structure: the bottleneck decomposition of the underlying network structure, and the utility function, defined as the total resources that one agent receives from its neighbors. However, Sybil attacks, under which an agent may form several fictitious players and split its resource among them, have been shown as a more difficult attack to defend against, and thus a strategic agent playing Sybil attacks may result in personal gain. Previous efforts have been made to show that an agent may generate a gain, but with limited gains by Sybil attacks on several special networks, including trees, cliques, and rings. This paper is the first to study the agent’s incentives by adopting a Sybil attack on general networks. The main contribution is to prove that any agent cannot obtain more than three times as much as the revenue when it plays honestly.\",\"PeriodicalId\":8478,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217595921500317\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217595921500317","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

由于BitTorrent系统在P2P网络上文件共享的成功,近年来对比例响应协议进行了广泛的研究。为了在P2P网络上分配单一类型的资源,比例响应协议已被证明是抗权重欺骗攻击和边缘欺骗攻击的策略证明。这种不受策略影响的特性是由于一种优雅的组合结构:底层网络结构的瓶颈分解和效用函数,效用函数定义为一个代理从其邻居那里接收到的总资源。然而,Sybil攻击是一种更难以防御的攻击,在这种攻击下,一个代理可能会组建几个虚拟的参与者,并在他们之间分配资源,因此一个战略代理进行Sybil攻击可能会带来个人利益。以前的研究已经表明,一个代理可能会产生增益,但在Sybil攻击几个特殊网络(包括树、集团和环)时,增益有限。本文首次在一般网络中采用Sybil攻击来研究agent的激励。主要的贡献是证明任何经纪人在诚实的情况下都不能获得超过三倍的收入。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Study on Agent Incentives for Resource Sharing on P2P Networks
There have recently been extensive studies on proportional response protocol, which is motivated by the successful BitTorrent system for file sharing over a P2P network. The proportional response protocol has been proved to be strategy-proof against weight cheating attacks and edge cheating attacks, in order to allocate a single type of resource on P2P networks. This strategy-proof property holds due to an elegant combinatorial structure: the bottleneck decomposition of the underlying network structure, and the utility function, defined as the total resources that one agent receives from its neighbors. However, Sybil attacks, under which an agent may form several fictitious players and split its resource among them, have been shown as a more difficult attack to defend against, and thus a strategic agent playing Sybil attacks may result in personal gain. Previous efforts have been made to show that an agent may generate a gain, but with limited gains by Sybil attacks on several special networks, including trees, cliques, and rings. This paper is the first to study the agent’s incentives by adopting a Sybil attack on general networks. The main contribution is to prove that any agent cannot obtain more than three times as much as the revenue when it plays honestly.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信