征求意见:主动与被动委托人

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Heikki Rantakari
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引用次数: 19

摘要

不知情的委托人从私下知情的代理人那里得到关于其项目质量的建议,然后可能进一步调查这些建议。尽管委托人获取更多信息的能力本身是有价值的,但它通常会排挤掉软信息,甚至可能使组织绩效恶化。进一步的研究对软信息精度的影响是非单调的。如果主动的委托人总是充分参与,那么他们比被动的委托人更受欢迎。选择性参与的负责人对组织最有害(JEL C72, D82, D83)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Soliciting Advice: Active versus Passive Principals
An uninformed principal elicits recommendations from privately informed agents regarding the quality of their projects, and may then further investigate the proposals. Although valuable by itself, the principal’s ability to acquire further information generally crowds out soft information, and may even worsen organizational performance. Further, the impact of further investigations on the precision of soft information is non-monotone. Activist principals are preferred over passive principals if they are always sufficiently involved. Principals that engage in selective involvement are most harmful to the organization (JEL C72, D82, D83).
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CiteScore
2.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
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