第11章实证理论

IF 2.1 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

New York University Law Review Pub Date : 1998-10-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.137897

Kevin A. Kordana, E. Posner

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引用次数: 99

摘要

本文利用非合作博弈论模型分析了第11章的投票规则。先前的工作主要依赖于债务人和拥有完全信息的单一债权人之间讨价还价的模型。我们通过考虑不完全信息下的双方讨价还价，以及单一债务人和多个债权人之间的讨价还价(具有完全和不完全信息)来扩展这项工作。此外，先前的工作侧重于解释第11章议价中独占期、绝对优先权规则和清算下限的作用。我们还考虑了多数主义和超多数主义、两院制和分类的作用，以及允许债权人相互购买债权的可取性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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A Positive Theory of Chapter 11

This paper analyzes the voting rules of Chapter 11 using models from noncooperative game theory. Prior work has relied mainly on a model of bargaining between the debtor and a single creditor with perfect information. We expand on this work by considering two-party bargaining with imperfect information, and bargaining (with perfect and imperfect information) among a single debtor and multiple creditors. In addition, prior work has focused on explaining the role of the exclusivity period, the absolute priority rule, and the liquidation floor in Chapter 11 bargaining. We also consider the role of majoritarianism and supermajoritarianism, bicameralism, and classification, and the desirability of allowing creditors to purchase claims from each other.

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来源期刊

New York University Law Review LAW-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The New York University Law Review is a generalist journal publishing legal scholarship in all areas, including legal theory and policy, environmental law, legal history, international law, and more. Each year, our six issues contain cutting-edge legal scholarship written by professors, judges, and legal practitioners, as well as Notes written by members of the Law Review.