{"title":"银行政策中的抵押品与逆向选择","authors":"Udo Broll, MICHAEL B. Gilroy","doi":"10.1111/J.1467-9957.1986.TB01278.X","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a theoretical model of lending which emphasizes the role of asymmetric information and total debt service obligations between creditors and debtors. The analytical approach is based upon that of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); however, emphasis here is placed upon collateral policy aspects of credit contracts as compared to the interest rate policy aspects. It is demonstrated that under certain market constellations, even assuming a completely flexible collateral banking policy, the credit market may be characterized by a disequilibrium situation.","PeriodicalId":83172,"journal":{"name":"The Manchester school of economic and social studies","volume":"26 1","pages":"357-366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1986-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Collateral in Banking Policy and Adverse Selection\",\"authors\":\"Udo Broll, MICHAEL B. Gilroy\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/J.1467-9957.1986.TB01278.X\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper presents a theoretical model of lending which emphasizes the role of asymmetric information and total debt service obligations between creditors and debtors. The analytical approach is based upon that of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); however, emphasis here is placed upon collateral policy aspects of credit contracts as compared to the interest rate policy aspects. It is demonstrated that under certain market constellations, even assuming a completely flexible collateral banking policy, the credit market may be characterized by a disequilibrium situation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":83172,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Manchester school of economic and social studies\",\"volume\":\"26 1\",\"pages\":\"357-366\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1986-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Manchester school of economic and social studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-9957.1986.TB01278.X\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Manchester school of economic and social studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-9957.1986.TB01278.X","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Collateral in Banking Policy and Adverse Selection
This paper presents a theoretical model of lending which emphasizes the role of asymmetric information and total debt service obligations between creditors and debtors. The analytical approach is based upon that of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); however, emphasis here is placed upon collateral policy aspects of credit contracts as compared to the interest rate policy aspects. It is demonstrated that under certain market constellations, even assuming a completely flexible collateral banking policy, the credit market may be characterized by a disequilibrium situation.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
