权力、威胁、意义框架:哲学批判

IF 2.6 0 PHILOSOPHY
A. Morgan
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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要:本文对权力威胁意义框架(PTMF)进行了哲学批判。该框架于2018年1月在英国推出,作为一种非病理化的理解精神痛苦的方式。它认为,那些被诊断为精神疾病的经历最好被理解为对权力消极运作的基于意义的威胁反应。我的评论由三部分组成。首先,PTMF认为它反对将精神痛苦视为疾病的概念。然而,PTMF对精神痛苦的描述与哲学文献中对精神疾病的描述非常相似。PTMF没有反思、承认或说明其判断精神痛苦为痛苦的依据。如果它真的这样做了,我认为它将产生一种精神痛苦的描述,这与许多其他精神疾病或障碍的描述非常相似。其次,我批评了PTMF中对意义的描述。我认为这种解释最终是一种简化的,行为的适应解释,淡化了经验中存在的重要方面。此外,在PTMF中解释意义的形成在概念上是混乱的。最后,我概述了对权力概念的批评,PTMF方法的巨大力量,被简化为威胁的概念。我认为这倾向于线性的因果关系观,在寻找精神痛苦的意义时是简化的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Power, Threat, Meaning Framework: A Philosophical Critique
Abstract:In this paper, I offer a philosophical critique of the Power Threat Meaning Framework (PTMF). This framework was launched in the UK in January 2018 as a non-pathologizing way of understanding mental distress. It argues that those experiences diagnosed as mental illnesses are better understood as meaning-based threat responses to the negative operation of power. My critique consists of three parts. First, the PTMF argues that it is opposed to a concept of mental distress as illness. However, the PTMF unfolds an account of mental distress that is very similar to other accounts of mental illness in the philosophical literature. The PTMF does not reflect upon, recognize or give an account of its own grounds for judging mental distress as distress. If it were to do so, I argue that it would produce an account of mental distress that is very similar to many other accounts of psychiatric illness or disorder. Second, I criticize the account given of meaning in the PTMF. I argue that this account is ultimately a reductive, behavioral account of adaptation that downplays important existential aspects of experience. Furthermore, the account of interpretive sense-making in the PTMF is conceptually confused. Finally, I outline a critique of the way that the concept of power, the great strength of the PTMF approach, is reduced to a concept of threat. I argue that this tends toward a linear view of causality that is reductive in its search for the meaning of mental distress.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
4.30%
发文量
40
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