集中代理客户密集型服务

Oper. Res. Pub Date : 2022-03-09 DOI:10.1287/opre.2022.2259
Zhongbin Wang, Luyi Yang, Shiliang Cui, Sezer Ülkü, Yong-Pin Zhou
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引用次数: 3

摘要

池还是不池?在客户密集型服务中,服务质量随着服务时间的增加而提高,服务提供商通常会将他们的座席集中起来,并给予绩效奖金,奖励座席实现更高的客户满意度和服务更多的客户。传统观点认为,汇集座席可以减少客户等待时间,而绩效奖金可以激励座席提供高质量的服务,这两者都应该提高客户满意度。然而,Wang, Yang, Cui, Ülkü, and Zhou在“客户密集型服务的座席汇集”中发现,座席在采取战略行动时,可能会选择在汇集下加速,以服务更多的客户,从而降低服务质量。如果发生这种情况,汇集可能会适得其反,导致客户满意度和座席报酬都降低。因此,研究人员提出了一个简单实用的解决方案来恢复池化的效率。他们建议将部分绩效奖金(激励池)与池化代理(运营池化)结合起来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Pooling Agents for Customer-Intensive Services
To Pool or Not to Pool? Analyzing Customer-Intensive Services with Strategic Agents In customer-intensive services where service quality increases with service time, service providers commonly pool their agents and give performance bonuses that reward agents for achieving greater customer satisfaction and serving more customers. Conventional wisdom suggests that pooling agents reduce customer wait time whereas performance bonuses motivate agents to produce high-quality services, both of which should boost customer satisfaction. However, in “Pooling Agents for Customer-Intensive Services,” Wang, Yang, Cui, Ülkü, and Zhou find that when agents act strategically, they may choose to speed up under pooling in an attempt to serve more customers, thus undermining service quality. If this happens, pooling can backfire and result in both lower customer satisfaction and agent payoff. Consequently, the researchers propose a simple practical solution to restore the efficiency of pooling. They propose pooling a portion of the performance bonuses (incentive pooling) in conjunction with pooling agents (operational pooling).
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