特定地区风格与美国风险投资合同

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Ola Bengtsson, S. Ravid
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引用次数: 6

摘要

本文研究了美国风险投资契约中存在的几种契约均衡。我们的数据库比以前的研究更大,包括1804份合同。我们的主要发现是,加州的企业家得到的合同条款不那么苛刻。特别是,受加州或加州式合约约束的投资者,其下行保护较少。即使我们将之前发现的所有决定合约设计的控制因素考虑在内,这种“加州效应”仍然非常显著。我们发现,如果风投公司位于加州,或者非加州风投公司对加州市场有很大的敞口,也会产生类似的影响。我们没有发现证据表明风投正在用现金流或有事项代替控制权或基于绩效的CEO薪酬合同。我们还记录了风险投资合同的其他几个新合同特征。特别是,我们发现更好的公司和更有经验的风投会得到更好的合同条款,而老公司会得到更苛刻的合同。我们还确认了集中和接近在金融合同中的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Location Specific Styles and US Venture Capital Contracting
This paper shows that several contractual equilibria coexist in the US venture capital (VC) contracts. Our database is larger than that of previous studies and includes 1,804 contracts. Our main finding is that California-based entrepreneurs receive less harsh contract terms. In particular, investors subject to California-based or California style contracts have less downside protection. This “California effect” remains large and significant even after we include all the previously discovered controls which determine contract design. We find a similar effect if the VC is located in California, or if a non-California VC had a large exposure to the California market. We do not find evidence that VCs are substituting cash flow contingencies for control rights or for performance-based CEO compensation contracts. We also document several other new contractual features of VC contracts. In particular, we find that better companies and more experienced VCs receive better contract terms, whereas older companies receive harsher contracts. We also confirm the role of concentration and proximity in financial contracts.
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来源期刊
Quarterly Journal of Finance
Quarterly Journal of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Journal of Finance publishes high-quality papers in all areas of finance, including corporate finance, asset pricing, financial econometrics, international finance, macro-finance, behavioral finance, banking and financial intermediation, capital markets, risk management and insurance, derivatives, quantitative finance, corporate governance and compensation, investments and entrepreneurial finance.
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