基于代理的英国汽车保险客户口碑行为模型

Rei England, Iqbal Owadally, D. Wright
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引用次数: 4

摘要

吸引和留住忠实客户是保险公司盈利的关键驱动力。客户对保险公司服务公平性的看法是影响保险公司服务公平性的一个重要因素。如果客户在保险公司有过不愉快的经历,他们就不太可能再次购买保险。口碑网络允许信息在顾客之间传播。在本文中,我们建立了一个基于agent的模型,其中包含两种类型的agent:客户和保险公司。保险公司是价格接受者,他们选择在服务质量上花多少钱,客户根据保费、品牌偏好和他们感知到的服务质量来评估保险公司。客户也连接在一个小世界网络中,并可能与他们的网络分享他们的意见。我们发现,网络的存在作为一种持久的记忆,导致了一种系统性偏见,即保险公司通过随机机会获得的早期声誉倾向于持续存在,并导致不平等的市场份额。即使在信息传输非常低的情况下,这种情况也会发生。这表明新成立的保险公司可能会从更高的服务质量中获益,因为他们建立了自己的声誉。服务质量越高的保险公司,即使客户对服务质量的偏好越低,也能获得更多的利润。英国监管机构打算禁止向新客户收取低于老客户费用的做法。当模型在这种情况下运行时,保留率大幅提高,并且从最初声誉良好的保险公司流失的人数减少。这增加了市场集中度的不平衡,但对优质服务的激励更大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An Agent-Based Model of Motor Insurance Customer Behaviour in the UK with Word of Mouth
: Attracting and retaining loyal customers is a key driver of insurance profit. An important factor is the customers’opinionofaninsurer’sservicequality. Ifacustomerhasabadexperiencewithaninsurer,theywillbe less likely to buy from them again. Word-of-mouth networks allow information to spread between customers. In this paper we build an agent-based model with two types of agents: customers and insurers. Insurers are price-takers who choose how much to spend on their service quality, and customers evaluate insurers based on premium, brand preference, and their perceived service quality. Customers are also connected in a small-world network and may share their opinions with their network. We find that the existence of the network acts as a persistent memory, causing a systemic bias whereby an insurer’s early reputation achieved by random chance tends to persist and leads to unequal market shares. This occurs even when the transmission of information is very low. This suggests that newer insurers might benefit more from a higher service quality as they build their reputation. Insurers with a higher service quality earn more profit, even when the customer preference for better service quality is small. The UK regulator is intending to ban the practice of charging new customers less than renewing customers. When the model is run with this scenario, the retention rates increase substantially and there is less movement away from insurers with a good initial reputation. This increases the skewness in market concentrations, but there is a greater incentive for good service quality.
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