扁平等级中的运气:工资、奖金和噪音

IF 1.1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Economic Record Pub Date : 2022-10-21 DOI:10.1111/1475-4932.12701

John G. Sessions, John D. Skåtun

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了一个扁平层级下的奖金，发现在一个带有噪声绩效指标的两种工人类型模型中，努力最优性是不存在的。敬业的工人从公司获取信息租金，而懒散的工人的努力是低效的。虽然测量噪声的增加降低了奖金的供给侧努力效应，但它们也引起了企业的需求侧反应，这些企业试图通过增加奖金来抵消工人努力程度的下降。我们的模型有助于解释经验观察，即奖金在嘈杂的环境中更为普遍，数额也更大，比如在金融部门。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Luck in a Flat Hierarchy: Wages, Bonuses and Noise

We study bonuses in a flat hierarchy and find effort optimality to be violated within a two worker-type model with noisy performance indicators. Dedicated workers extract informational rents from firms whilst slack worker effort is inefficiently low. Whilst increases in measurement noise reduce the supply-side effort effects of bonuses, they also induce demand-side responses from firms seeking to counteract falling worker exertion by increasing bonuses. Our model helps to explain empirical observations that bonuses are more prevalent and larger in jobs with noisy environments, such as within the financial sector.

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来源期刊

Economic Record ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

16.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Published on behalf of the Economic Society of Australia, the Economic Record is intended to act as a vehicle for the communication of advances in knowledge and understanding in economics. It publishes papers in the theoretical, applied and policy areas of economics and provides a forum for research on the Australian economy. It also publishes surveys in economics and book reviews to facilitate the dissemination of knowledge.