填补空白:为Corona做好准备
引用次数: 1
摘要
银行也不能幸免于COVID-19。经济衰退可能会使一些银行陷入无法生存的境地。如果是这样，欧元区的决议机制准备好应对了吗?不，因为银行可能没有适当数量的、适当种类的负债来让纾困发挥作用。这可能导致银行业危机。欧元区可以通过现在的安排来避免这种风险。这将填补破产银行现有资金与实施纾困所需资金之间的缺口。为此，银行将向一家欧洲担保机构支付一笔承诺费——可能是通过它们对单一清算基金(Single Resolution Fund)的捐款——以建立一个强制性的全系统票据发行机制。这将迫使每家银行，当它们到达PONV时，向担保机构发行，而担保机构则从银行购买，破产银行需要的债券，以使纾困生效。此类债务将以“最优先”非优先债务的形式出现，而内部纾困将止于此类债务。这将使SRB能够利用纾困工具来解决破产银行的问题，让其重新开张，并在有偿付能力的逐步关闭策略下运营。这保护了交易对手和客户，并确保了关键经济功能的连续性。它还使投资者处于风险之中，并促进了市场纪律。最重要的是，它保持了金融稳定。本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。
Plug the Gap: Make Resolution Ready for Corona
Banks are not immune from COVID-19. The economic downturn may drive some banks to the point of non-viability (PONV). If so, is the resolution regime in the Euro-area ready to respond?
No, for banks may not have the right amount of the right kind of liabilities to make bail-in work. That could lead to a banking crisis.
The Euro area can avoid this risk, by arranging now for a recap later. This would plug the gap between what the failing bank has and what it would need to make bail-in work. To do so, banks would pay – possibly via the contributions they make to the Single Resolution Fund – a commitment fee to a European backstop authority for a mandatory, system-wide note issuance facility. This would compel each bank, as it reached the PONV, to issue to the backstop, and the backstop to purchase from the bank, the obligations the failing bank needs in order to make bail-in work. Such obligations would take the form of “senior-most” non-preferred debt, and bail-in would stop with such debt. That would allow the SRB to use the bail-in tool to resolve the failed bank, reopen it and run it under a solvent wind down strategy.
That protects counterparties and customers and ensures the continuity of critical economic functions. It also keeps investors at risk and promotes market discipline. Above all, it preserves financial stability.
No, for banks may not have the right amount of the right kind of liabilities to make bail-in work. That could lead to a banking crisis.
The Euro area can avoid this risk, by arranging now for a recap later. This would plug the gap between what the failing bank has and what it would need to make bail-in work. To do so, banks would pay – possibly via the contributions they make to the Single Resolution Fund – a commitment fee to a European backstop authority for a mandatory, system-wide note issuance facility. This would compel each bank, as it reached the PONV, to issue to the backstop, and the backstop to purchase from the bank, the obligations the failing bank needs in order to make bail-in work. Such obligations would take the form of “senior-most” non-preferred debt, and bail-in would stop with such debt. That would allow the SRB to use the bail-in tool to resolve the failed bank, reopen it and run it under a solvent wind down strategy.
That protects counterparties and customers and ensures the continuity of critical economic functions. It also keeps investors at risk and promotes market discipline. Above all, it preserves financial stability.
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