攻击Windows Hello业务:这是我们所承诺的吗?

Joseph Haddad, N. Pitropakis, C. Chrysoulas, M. Lemoudden, W. Buchanan
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引用次数: 1

摘要

传统的密码身份验证方法在过去引发了许多问题,包括不安全的实践,因此身份验证的演变应该以无密码解决方案的形式出现也就不足为奇了。本研究旨在探索密码认证和密码策略存在的问题,并旨在部署Windows Hello for Business (WHFB)。这包括创建三个虚拟机(vm)并评估WHFB作为无密码解决方案,并展示具有特权访问权限的攻击者如何使用Mimikatz从计算机内存中检索最终用户的域密码,并描述可能的结果。所进行的研究测试以两种攻击方法的形式进行。这可以通过创建以以下方式运行的三个vm来实现。第一个VM将充当域控制器(DC)和证书颁发机构服务器(CA服务器)。第二个VM将充当Active Directory联合服务(ADFS)。第三个VM将充当最终用户设备。测试结果研究表明:无密码认证的安全性远远高于传统的认证方式;这一点在提交人的测试中得到了证明。在第一次测试中,可以从已注册的WHFB设备中检索密码,而该设备仍处于部署的第二阶段。第二个测试是对WHFB的PIN进行暴力攻击;由于WHFB有防止这类攻击的措施,所以这次攻击没有成功。然而,即使成功地检索了密码,实现这一结果仍然存在一些障碍。结论是,许多组织仍然使用密码身份验证作为访问设备和应用程序的主要身份验证方法。像Microsoft和Google这样的大型组织支持对最终用户采用无密码身份验证,并且目前鼓励这两个组织共享的无密码身份验证的使用。这通常会导致组织为其IT基础设施采用这种新的解决方案。这是因为它已经被数百万人使用和测试,并被证明是安全的。这支持了使用量增加的结果,以及当今用户对无密码身份验证的需求。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Attacking Windows Hello for Business: Is It What We Were Promised?
Traditional password authentication methods have raised many issues in the past, including insecure practices, so it comes as no surprise that the evolution of authentication should arrive in the form of password-less solutions. This research aims to explore the problems that password authentication and password policies present and aims to deploy Windows Hello for Business (WHFB) on-premises. This includes creating three virtual machines (VMs) and evaluating WHFB as a password-less solution and showing how an attacker with privileged access may retrieve the end user’s domain password from the computer’s memory using Mimikatz and describing the possible results. The conducted research tests are in the form of two attack methods. This was feasible by the creation of three VMs operating in the following way. The first VM will act as a domain controller (DC) and certificate authority server (CA server). The second VM will act as an Active Directory Federation Service (ADFS). The third VM will act as the end-user device. The test findings research summarized that password-less authentication is far more secure than the traditional authentication method; this is evidenced throughout the author’s tests. Within the first test, it was possible to retrieve the password from an enrolled device for WHFB while it was still in the second phase of the deployment. The second test was a brute-force attack on the PIN of WHFB; since WHFB has measures to prevent such attacks, the attack was unsuccessful. However, even though the retrieval of the password was successful, there are several obstacles to achieving this outcome. It was concluded that many organizations still use password authentication as their primary authentication method for accessing devices and applications. Larger organizations such as Microsoft and Google support the adoption of password-less authentication for end-users, and the current usage of password-less authentication shared by both organizations is encouraged. This usually leads organizations to adopt this new solution for their IT infrastructure. This is because it has been used and tested by millions of people and has proven to be safe. This supports the findings of increased usage and the need for password-less authentication by today’s users.
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