J. Sadler, K. Fulford, A. Aftab, Anna Bergqvist, Mona Gupta, T. Thornton, M. Wong, Josephine Gough, P. Lieberman, Dominic Murphy, A. Morgan, M. Rashed, H. Carel, Greta Kaluzeviciute, Joshua Moreton
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Introduction to the 30th Anniversary Issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
Abstract:The titular question, of what makes a disorder 'mental,' has an obvious answer: mental disorders are disorders of the mind. I argue that this is not so, before proposing a positive theory of what makes a disorder 'mental,' that what makes a disorder 'mental' is its relationship to psychiatry. The overall thrust of my argument is that mental disorder is mental in name only—to have a mental disorder is not to have a disorder of the mind. Instead, mental disorder is psychiatric disorder, a class of conditions grouped together not because of anything to do with the mind, but because of their relationship to psychiatry, a concrete group of methods, practices, and institutions.